Working-Age, but Not Working, 1960 to 2024

The share of U.S.-born men not in the labor force — neither working nor looking for work — has increased dramatically since the 1960s, particularly for those without a bachelor’s degree. Because they are not actively looking for work, they are not counted as unemployed. While the share out of the labor force in 2024 has roughly returned to pre-pandemic levels, it remains extremely high by historical standards. This is relevant to the immigration debate because one of the arguments for allowing in so many legal immigrants, or even tolerating illegal immigration, is that there are not enough workers. But this ignores the enormous increase in the number of working-age people not in the labor force. Further, being out of the labor force is associated with profound social problems such as crime, overdose deaths, and welfare dependency. Policy-makers should consider encouraging work among the millions on the economic sidelines rather than ignoring the problem by bringing in ever more immigrants.

(The report is based on national data; see the companion report breaking out state-level results here.)

• The share of U.S.-born, working-age (16 to 64) men not in the labor force has increased for six decades. It was 11.3 percent in April 1960, 16.9 percent in April 2000, and 22.1 percent in April 2024.
• Among “prime-age” U.S.-born men (25 to 54), the group most likely to work, the share not in the labor force was 4 percent in April 1960, 8.5 percent in 2000 and 11.6 percent in 2024.
• This deterioration is not due to “population aging”, as the analysis focuses only on the working-age. Further, even the share of younger U.S.-born men (25 to 34) not in the labor force has increased over the last six decades.
• The share not in the labor force for U.S.-born Black, white, and Hispanic men has deteriorated significantly over the decades.
• If the same share of U.S.-born men (16 to 64) were in the labor force in 2024 as in 1960 there would be nine million more U.S.-born men in the labor force. Even if the share returned only to the 2000 level, it would still add 4.4 million men to the labor force.
• The number of U.S.-born men (16 to 64) not in the labor force increased by 13.2 million from 1960 to 2024. At the same time, the number of working-age immigrant men in the labor force increased by 14.1 million.
• In April of this year, 28.6 percent of U.S.-born women (16 to 64) were not in the labor force, above the level pre-Covid, but below the low of 27.6 percent in 2000.
• The total number of U.S.-born men and women (16 to 64) not in the labor force was 43 million in April 2024 — 8.5 million more than in 2000. This does not include the 9.7 million immigrant men and women not in the labor force nor does it include 5.8 million immigrant and U.S.-born unemployed.¹
• The share of immigrant men (16 to 64) out of the labor force is a complex story. It fell some from 1960 to 1980, then increased until 2006 and the Great Recession. Since then, the share not in the labor force has increased from 12.8 percent in 2006 to 14.8 percent in 2024.
• For immigrant women, the share not in the labor force increased steadily for decades, though it still does not match the rate for U.S.-born women in 2024.

Among those without a bachelor’s:

• Excluding teenagers, the share of U.S.-born men 20 to 64 without a bachelor’s not in the labor force increased from 7 percent in 1960 to 13 percent in 1980, to 15.9 percent in 2000, and to 21.8 percent in April of this year.
• Looking only at “prime-age” U.S.-born men, 25 to 54, without a bachelor’s, we see a rise in the share not in the labor force, from 4.2 percent in 1960, to 10.6 percent in 2000, to 15.2 percent in April 2024.
• The share of U.S.-born women (20 to 64) without a bachelor’s not in the labor force was 31.9 percent in April of this year, lower than the 33.1 percent in 2019 before Covid. However, the share has not returned to the 28.3 percent it was in 2000.
• Male immigrants (20 to 64) without a bachelor’s have not been entirely immune from the rise in the share not working. In 2006, 11 percent of less-educated immigrant men were not in the labor force. In 2024 it was 13.8 percent.

Introduction

The purpose of this analysis is to address the often-asked question of where workers could come from to fill jobs in the economy without continued large-scale immigration. In a series of reports based on quarterly data from the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS), the Center for Immigration Studies has tried to answer that question by looking at the labor market situation for the U.S.-born and immigrants. Those reports show a profound decline in the share of working-age U.S.-born Americans in the labor force since 2000 and, as a result, an enormous number of working-age people on the economic sidelines. As our analysis makes clear, this finding is well established, and a number of other researchers have published similar findings.

Those in the labor force are working (full- and part-time) or looking for work; those outside the labor force are neither working nor looking for work, and are not counted as unemployed because they are not actively seeking a job.² We focus on peak years of the business cycle starting in 1960. To do this, we use decennial census data, along with CPS data. Looking back six decades, we find that the increase in the share of U.S.-born men not in the labor force is most pronounced among those without a bachelor’s degree. Like other researchers, we exclude those in institutions (primarily prisons and jails) from our analysis. We focus on men in our discussion because, unlike women, men have not been heavily impacted by the profound social, cultural, and legal changes that caused an ever-larger share of women to join the labor force in the last 60 years. Of course, we also report figures for women.

Historical census data has the advantage of allowing us to look at labor force participation by nativity, which is not really possible with the CPS before 1994.³ However, the decennial census only provides information every 10 years and it no longer asks about citizenship. Moreover, census years do not necessarily correspond to peak years of labor force participation between recessions, which is typically the best way to look at the long-term decline.⁴ Nonetheless, census data is really the only nativity data going back decades.

We use the 1960 through 1990 censuses and from 2000 onward we use the April CPS to examine labor force participation in the peak years of 2000, 2006, 2019, and 2024.⁵ To supplement this data, we also report statistics for every year going back to the early 1960s using the Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS ASEC). The CPS ASEC is an expanded version of the monthly CPS and is done annually. The survey oversamples minorities and also includes many additional questions; it is one of the primary sources of information about family structure, poverty, income, and health insurance coverage. The CPS ASEC is also somewhat larger than the monthly CPS, making it ideal to measure immigrants.

We use the term “immigrant” in this report synonymously with “foreign-born”. This includes all those who were not U.S.-citizens at birth, including illegal immigrants.⁶ Also, our discussion of participation in the labor force is only for those of working age, which we define in various ways, but always excludes children under age 16 and those 65 and older. In contrast, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reports labor force statistics for the population 16 and older in its monthly employment situation reports. Including the elderly can make sense depending on the research question, but doing so conflates the decline in participation among the working-age with the overall aging of American society.

Why Labor Force Participation Matters

Labor Force Participation in the Context of Immigration. The cacophony of voices calling for ever more immigration because there are not enough workers includes numerous academics, business groups, advocacy groups, politicians, and a plethora of opinion writers. Immigration advocates typically point to low unemployment, the aging of society, or more technical measures of the number of unfilled jobs to make the case that the supply of workers is inadequate and more immigration is needed. What is perhaps most striking about virtually all of this advocacy and commentary is that the deterioration in labor force participation never even comes up. This occurs despite the fact that the declining participation in the labor force is well documented and the number of working-age people currently not in the labor force is in the tens of millions. Any discussion of the need for more foreign workers should be conducted with an understanding of the enormous number of working-age people not working. This is especially the case because there is a clear consensus that the decline in labor force participation has detrimental effects.

The list of negative outcomes for individuals, their families, and society associated with being out of the labor force is so long that it can barely be summarized here. The issue has been extensively studied by academics, the Brookings Institution, the Obama White House, the Federal Reserve, and many others. Probably the best book on the subject is Nicholas Eberstadt’s Men Without Work. There simply is no question that the growing number of working-age people not in the labor force, particularly men, contributes to a long list of profound social problems.

Impacts at the Individual Level. It should be obvious that being in the labor force significantly increases income and dramatically reduces the risk of being in poverty.⁷ There is also good evidence that not working is associated with a deterioration in mental health. In addition, being out of the labor force is linked with declining physical well-being. Research shows that not working has a negative effect on the incidence of obesity and the associated health problems this creates. Perhaps most important, there seems to be a strong association between not working and so-called “deaths of despair”, including suicide, drug overdose, and destructive levels of alcohol consumption and death from poisoning.

Societal Impacts. Research by the Federal Reserve shows that low labor force participation reduces economic growth. Not surprisingly, both the Congressional Budget Office and the Obama White House pointed out that deterioration in participation in the labor force has negative fiscal implications, as fewer people pay taxes and more make use of public benefits.⁸ Men not in the labor force also make relatively unattractive marriage partners, so non-participation in the labor force hinders family formation. Additionally, more than one study has found that not being employed is associated with social isolation. In contrast, being in the labor force leads to greater political participation and civic engagement. There are a significant number of studies showing a link between not working and crime. The bottom line is that not working is not simply bad for those out of the labor market, it has significant negative implications for their families and the broader American society.

Findings

In the analysis that follows, we discuss the results shown in the figures, which summarize our findings. However, we also provide Excel spreadsheets for those wanting more information. The Excel file reports more detailed labor force statistics by nativity, gender, education level, and race using different definitions of the working age in the peak (or near-peak) years of 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 based on the census and the April CPS for 2000, 2006, 2019, and 2024. The census and April CPS data are the sources for Figures 1 through 12 in this report. The decennial census and the April CPS are the source for much of the detailed information in the Excel file as well. We also use the CPS ASEC to report detailed information for those not in the labor force by age, race, and education level from 1962 to 2024 for every year. This data is used for Figures 13 and 14 as well.⁹ We focused on working-age natives without a bachelor’s degree for simplicity, rather than the various education levels that comprise this group. We often refer to those without a bachelor’s as the “less-educated”. The Excel spreadsheets included in this report and our prior research show that the sub-groups of U.S.-born men without a bachelor’s such as those with only a high school education, show a similar deterioration in participation in the labor force.¹⁰

Share of U.S.-Born Men Not in the Labor Force. Figure 1 reports the share of working-age, U.S.-born men not in the labor force, with working age defined broadly as 16 to 64. The figure shows that the share not in the labor force has increase for six decades for U.S.-born men. Overall, the share of men born in the United States not working or looking for work was 10.8 percentage points higher in 2024 than in 1960. Even compared to 2000, it was 5.2 percentage points higher today. If we look at only those with no education beyond high school, then the increase of those not in the labor force is 20.8 percentage points since 1960. For men without a bachelor’s degree, the rise is 15.8 percentage points from 1960 to 2024. Since 2000, the increase for those with no education beyond high school is 8.9 percentage points, which is similar to the 7.7 percentage-point increase for the larger group of those without a bachelor’s. All of these changes are very large because they represent millions of people on the sidelines of the economy. Figure 1 also shows some increase among those with at least a bachelor’s degree, though not so much recently.

Looking at Different Age Groups. One might imagine that the increase in workers not in the labor force for the working-age is only due to American teenagers working less. The increase in the number of Americans attending school, particularly college, may also explain the rise. Or perhaps the results reflect early retirements. But this is not what happened. Figure 2 excludes teenagers and shows that the deterioration from 1960 to 2024 is still nearly 15 percentage points for U.S.-born men 20 to 64 without a bachelor’s degree. It is true that a larger share of Americans are in school, particularly those under age 25, today than in 1960 or even 2000. Of course, students then and now can and often still do work. Even part-time work counts as being in the labor force. But even if we restrict the analysis to only those 25 to 54, what economists often call the “prime age” for work, we still find the same pattern.

Figure 3 shows that in 1960 the share of prime-age men not in the labor force was only 4 percent. This was roughly true for all educational levels. U.S.-born men were almost all working regardless of their education level. But this has changed significantly since then. At nearly 12 percent overall in 2024, the share of all prime-age, U.S.-born men not in the labor force is nearly three times what it was in 1960. The increase for those with only a high school education (14.1 percentage points) and all those without a bachelor’s (11 percentage points) is very large. A substantially larger share of less-educated, prime-age U.S.-born men are out of the labor force today compared to 2000 as well.

The Possibility of a “Creaming” Effect. The growth in the share not in the labor force for the less-educated could be caused by the so called “creaming” effect. That is, the most academically oriented and employable part of the population now have college degrees, something that relatively fewer people had in the past. In 1960, 10 percent of men 20 to 64 had a bachelor’s, by 2024 it was 35 percent; and among prime-age men it increased from 12 percent to 38 percent. So perhaps when we only look at those without a bachelor’s over time, we are really looking at the increasingly less employable part of the population. However, Figures 1 through 3 show that the share not in the labor force for the entire U.S.-born male working-age population, regardless of education, has increased. There can be no creaming when all working-age people are considered. Further, although not as pronounced, those with a college degree also show some increase in not being in the labor force. So, while the very pronounced increase in the share not in the labor force among less-educated men specifically might be partly explained by creaming, it certainly cannot explain the overall increase. Nor does the creaming phenomenon mitigate all the negative effects on society caused by the increase in those not participating in the labor force.

It is worth adding that the significant increase in the share of working-age people with a college degree over the decades should have reduced the overall share not in the labor force as more educated people tend to have higher participation rates, but the opposite happened. While increasing the education level of the U.S. population might be a good idea for any number of reasons, based on the last six decades it is unlikely to solve the overall problem of the increased rate of working-age men neither working nor looking for work.

The U.S.-Born by Race. Figure 4 reports the share not in the labor force for U.S.-born non-Hispanic Black, non-Hispanic white, and Hispanic men ages 16 to 64. There are some differences between groups, with Hispanics showing little change from 1970 to 2000, but a steep increase in the 1960s and in the last two decades. It is worth mentioning, however, that the way in which Hispanics are identified has changed over time and this is likely to have some impact on the data prior to 2000. Moreover, race is also not consistent over time because after 2000 the monthly CPS allows respondents to choose more than one race.¹¹ Putting those issues aside, whites show the most consistent deterioration in the share not in the labor force. U.S.-born Blacks have the highest share not in the labor force to begin with, but after 1970 their increase is very similar to whites so the gap between the two was relatively stable after that year. No group has been exempt from this extremely long-term troubling social trend, though in 2024 the rate for all three groups is either equal to or better than the level in 2019 before Covid.

Less-Educated Men by Race. Figure 5 reports figures for prime-age (25-54) U.S.-born men without a bachelor’s by race. The share of less-educated Black, white, and Hispanic men not in the labor force has generally increased for all three groups since 1960. Among less-educated Black men the rate went up until 2006 and has not changed much at the peaks in 2006, 2019, or 2024. Among whites there has been a pretty steady increase since 1960 and the rate in 2024, like Blacks, is not quite back to what it was pre-Covid. While the share of U.S-born Hispanics not in the labor force is much higher now than it was prior to 1990, there has not been a steady increase in the way there has been for whites. Also, the share out of the labor force for less-educated, U.S.-born Hispanics in April 2024 was below the level in 2019, before Covid. Overall, among all three racial groups, men without a bachelor’s are much more likely to be out of the labor force today than in earlier decades, though Hispanics show recent improvement.

Younger Men. Figure 6 shows that adult, U.S.-born men who are young (25 to 34) have also experienced a significant increase in the share not in the labor force. The increase from 1960 to 2024 for this youthful population is 7.4 percentage points overall and 10 percentage points for those without a bachelor’s. This is similar to the 7.6 percentage-point increase overall for U.S.-born men 25 to 54 and the 11 percentage-point increase for men in this age group with less than a bachelor’s. This is a clear indication that the increasing share of U.S.-born men out of the labor force is not simply a function of an aging work force.

Number of U.S.-Born Men Not in the Labor Force. Figure 7 shows the total U.S.-born working-age (16 to 64) male population from 1960 to 2024 relative to the increase in the number in the labor force. Because labor force growth did not keep pace with population growth, the number of U.S.-born men out of the labor force increased dramatically. In April 2024, 18.5 million U.S.-born men 16 to 64 were not in the labor force, up from 12.7 million in 2000 and 5.3 million in 1960.¹² Figure 8 shows the number of men who would have been in the labor force if the participation rate had remained at the 1960 level or the 2000 level. If the same share of U.S.-born men (16 to 64) were in the labor force in April 2024 as in 1960 there would be nine million more U.S.-born men in the labor force. If the share in the labor force only returned to the 2000 rate, it would still add 4.4 million men to the labor force.¹³ Figure 9 shows that the growth in the number of men not in the labor force is substantial even if the age range is restricted. The number of immigrant men in the labor force (16 to 64) grew by eight million from 1960 to 2000 and increased another 6.1 million through 2024. So it is certainly the case that as the number of male immigrants in the labor force grew dramatically, the number of U.S.-born men out of the labor force also increased dramatically.

The Situation for U.S.-Born Women. Figure 10 shows the share of U.S.-born women ages 16 to 64 not in the labor force from 1960 to 2024. The revolution in social norms and legal protections for women is clearly evident in the figure, which shows a dramatic decrease in the share not in the labor force since 1960. In 2000 it reached a low point overall and for women without a bachelor’s. The rate for U.S.-born women 16 to 64 in 2024 has not made it back to the 2000 level, though it is better than in 2019 before Covid. (Using other age ranges shows the same pattern; see Excel sheets linked here.) If the same share of U.S.-born women were in the labor force in April 2024 as in April 2000, it would add 900,000 more women to the labor force. The share of women with at least a bachelor’s not in the labor force is now lower than in 2000, indicating that this group has fared well in the post-Covid period. But, like their male counterparts, less-educated, American-born women have struggled, with the share not in the labor force 5.6 percent points higher in 2024 than in 2000. This compares to a 7.7 percentage-point increase for less-educated, U.S.-born men. That said, the share of non-college women not in the labor force is 1.1 percentage-points lower now than it was in 2019, at the prior peak of the business cycle.

Immigrants. Figure 11 shows the share of immigrant men ages 16 to 64 not in the labor force. It is worth pointing out again that the decennial census and CPS data include both legal and illegal immigrants. There was a rather significant increase in the share of foreign-born men not in the labor force from 1960 to 1980. But it declined thereafter, reaching a low in 2006 before the Great Recession, which is very different than the sustained climb for U.S.-born men from 1980 to 2006. The rise from 1960 to 1980 should be interpreted with an understanding that the immigrant population can change more quickly than the U.S.-born population, which it did from 1960 to 1980. In 1960, there were still some working-age immigrants who entered during the so-called great wave of immigration, prior to 1924. Perhaps more importantly, the immigrants in the immediate post-WW II period from Europe tended to be relatively modest in number and relatively higher-skilled.¹⁴ As that population fell as a share of the total foreign-born population after 1960, the share not in the labor force might have been impacted.

Compared to 2006, Figure 11 shows that the overall share of immigrant men 16 to 64 not in the labor force has increased by two percentage points, compared to a 2.6 percentage-point growth for U.S.-born men (Figure 1). This is not a huge change, but does represent a deterioration for both groups after the Great Recession. While U.S.-born men in this age group overall have returned to the level in 2019, this is not the case for immigrants, with the share not in the labor force still somewhat above what it was in 2019. Turning to the less-educated, we see that the percentage of immigrant men without a bachelor’s not in the labor force was 3.1 percentage points higher in 2024 than in 2006. While somewhat less than the 4.6 percentage-point deterioration for U.S.-born men without a bachelor’s over this same time period, it is still an indication that both groups have seen a significant rise in the share not in the labor force. It would appear that whatever has caused less-educated U.S.-born men to leave the labor force has also impacted less-educated immigrants. However, like the increase in the share not in the labor force from 1960 to 1980 discussed above, it is possible that changes in the composition of immigrants since 2006 could have played some role in the increase in working-age immigrant men not in the labor force.

A Huge Pool of Potential Labor. Figure 12 shows the number of working-age (16 to 64) immigrants and U.S.-born of both sexes not in the labor force. There were a total of 52.7 million non-institutionalized people out of the labor force in April of this year. Of those not in the labor force, 43 million or 82 percent were U.S.-born — an increase of 8.5 million since 2000. The number of working-age immigrants of both sexes not in the labor force was 9.7 million in 2024, 3.4 million more than in 2000. The consistent growth in the number of working-age, U.S.-born men not in the labor force reflects the increasing percentage not participating in the labor force coupled with population growth. That is, a smaller share of a larger population is working or looking for work, so the number not in the labor force continues to increase. Population growth plays a larger role for the increase in U.S.-born women not in the labor force, though the deterioration in their participation since 2000 accounts for about half of the increase in the number not in the labor force. The participation rates for foreign-born men have also declined since 2006 and this explains some of the increase among the foreign-born not in the labor force after that year. There has been no increase in the percentage of immigrant women not in the labor force, so population growth alone accounts for any increase in the number not in the labor force for women.

Those Not in the Labor Force. Of course, the enormous number of working-age people not in the labor force does not mean all or even most of these individuals can, should, or would work. Many are in school, others care for family members, some are disabled, others have retired early, and to be sure some could legitimately be described as lazy and completely unwilling to ever work. What these numbers do mean is that there is a very large pool of potential workers available, some of whom could be brought into the labor force if properly paid and treated by employers. Not so long ago, a much larger share of working-age people were, in fact, in the labor force. As already discussed, if the same share of U.S.-born working-age men and women were in the labor force today as in the recent past it would add millions of workers. Or put a different way, if only 15 percent of working-age, U.S.-born people not in the labor force were to join/rejoin it, it would add 6.4 million workers to the labor force; this is nearly equal to all the immigrants (6.7 million) added to the labor force since 2010.¹⁵

Looking at Data from Every Year. Figure 13 shows the share of men 16 to 64 not in the labor force for every year, rather than during peak years, from 1962 through 2024 based on the CPS ASEC. (See the introduction of this report for a discussion of the CPS ASEC.) We know from decennial census data that 6 to 8 percent of the male labor force from 1960 to 1980 was foreign-born, so the increase in the share not in the labor force in the 1960s and 1970s primarily reflects the decline for U.S.-born men. Though, as Figure 11 shows, an increasing share of immigrant men were not in the labor force from 1960 to 1980. The share not in the labor force typically grows after each recession, which is to be expected since, like unemployment, it is a lagging indicator of the economy. But what Figure 13 shows is that participation in the labor force generally did not make it back to pre-recession levels for the U.S.-born once the economy recovered.

Figure 13 also shows that in 1994, the first year for which CPS ASEC has nativity data, there was only a modest difference in rates between immigrants and the U.S.-born.¹⁶ The 1990 census also showed similar levels of participation for the two groups (see Figures 1 and 11). But from the early 1990s onward, the share of immigrant men not in the labor force decreased until the Great Recession, while it rose for the U.S.-born. It is interesting that for foreign-born men, the CPS ASEC shows that the share of those not in the labor force was lowest in 2007 and it has never quite dropped back to that level, though the increase since 2007 is not as profound as it has been for U.S.-born men.

The Less-Educated Every Year. As we have seen, the share not in the labor force increased especially for U.S.-born men without a college degree. Figure 14 reports the share not in the labor force for foreign- and U.S.-born men without a bachelor’s degree ages 20 to 64 for every year using the CPS ASEC. As is the case for the entire working-age population shown in Figure 13, less-educated immigrants and U.S.-born American men had a similar rate of not being in the labor force in 1994. But that changed thereafter, with the immigrant rate decreasing and the U.S.-born rate climbing. As is true for immigrants overall, the share not in the labor force for less-educated immigrants has not returned to the low before the Great Recession, at least through 2024. That said, the share not in the labor force for less-educated immigrant men was 3.6 percentage points higher in 2024 than before the Great Recession in 2006. This increase is nearly the same as the 3.5 percentage-point increase for less-educated U.S.-born men over the same time period. The CPS ASEC, like decennial census data and the April monthly CPS figures shown in prior figures, all show a significant growth in the share not in the labor force among less-educated men, immigrant and U.S.-born alike, with the increase being a good deal larger and long-term for the U.S.-born.

What’s Causing the Decline?

There are clearly a huge number of working-age people on the economic sidelines due to the profound long-term decline in the labor force participation of working-age, U.S.-born men, and to some extent women. However, the causes of the decline are much debated. Below we briefly summarize some of the explanations offered for the falloff in participation. It seems certain that there is no single cause for the decline. Rather, many factors likely contribute to the problem and these factors almost certainly interact with each other in complex ways.

Weak Labor Demand. There is no question, as Figures 13 and 14 show, that the share not in the labor force rises during recessions when demand for labor is slack. But it is less clear why the rate does not return to pre-recessions levels when the job market recovers. The total number (immigrant and U.S.-born) of men and women without a bachelor’s holding a job increased from 59.2 million in 1960 to 100.4 million in 2006, right before the Great Recession. Demand for labor was certainly weak over this 46-year period. The number of these less-educated workers holding a job is 95.5 million in 2024, as the U.S. population became ever more educated. Still, it is very hard to argue that demand for less-educated workers somehow collapsed, especially before 2006 when demand seemed to steadily increase.¹⁷

Nonetheless, both the Obama White House and the Brookings Institution emphasized weak labor demand and the resulting decline in wages for the less-educated as an important cause of the increase in those leaving the labor force. Other researchers have come to similar conclusions. Globalization, particularly trade and technological innovations, sometimes referred to as “skill-biased technological change”, are typically identified as key causes for reducing demand for less-educated workers.¹⁸ Clearly, low wages are a disincentive to work and must have played some role in the growth of those not in the labor force. But if demand for less-educated labor is weak, and this is causing a growing number of less-educated American men to leave the labor force, then current immigration policy is profoundly misguided.

In the April 2024 CPS, 11.7 million immigrant workers (legal and illegal) without a bachelor’s degree indicated they came to the United States in 2000 or later.¹⁹ Immigration has certainly added enormously to the supply of less-educated workers. That said, we know that the majority of jobs in nearly every occupational category, as defined by the Department of Commerce, are done by the U.S.-born, so the argument that immigrants only do jobs Americans don’t want is false. Adding so many new less-educated workers to the economy when demand did not keep pace with the size of the non-college population seems very unwise if we want to improve the share of working-age men in the labor force and avoid all the negative consequences caused by its decline.

Labor Demand Relative to Immigration. It is reasonable to argue that demand for less-educated male labor has been weak relative to the increase in the supply of less-educated workers once immigration is taken into account. From 1960 to 2006, the number of 16- to 64-year-old, less-educated men in the labor force (both immigrant and U.S.-born) increased 15.3 million, but only 8.1 million of that increase went to the U.S.-born, while the rest went to immigrant men. The 8.1 million increase represented a 21.5 percent increase in the number of less-educated, U.S.-born, working-age men in the labor force. However, the total number of working-age, less-educated, U.S.-born men (in and out of the labor force) increased 39.3 percent (16.7 million) over this same time period, hence the huge decline in their participation rate. Since 2006, the overall number of working-age, U.S.-born men without a bachelor’s has fallen, but only by 3.6 percent (2.2 million).²⁰ However, the number in the labor force fell 9.4 percent (4.3 million), so their participation continued its deterioration after 2006. As for less-educated, working-age, male immigrants, the number in the labor force actually increased by one million from 2006 to 2024. It is clear that demand for less-educated male workers has not kept pace with the total population of less-educated, working-age men, at least when immigrants are included. The result has been a huge increase in the share of U.S.-born men not in the labor force.

Changing Social Norms. Nicholas Eberstadt argues that slack labor demand for less-educated workers is an inadequate explanation because foreign-born men with modest levels of education have not experienced the same decline as U.S.-born men. Perhaps even more important, the decline for less-educated, unmarried men is much more pronounced than for married men of the same age and skill level. He believes that changing expectations about men as providers explains much of the decline due in large part to the decline in institutions that reinforced the value of work, particularly marriage. This makes it increasingly acceptable for men to rely on family members, such as parents or partners, for support. He also argues that the welfare state undermines work and enables those not in the labor force to at least have some income. These arguments echo those made by anti-poverty researcher Lawrence Mead, who has long argued that “culture” and “social isolation” are key reasons why an increasing share of working-age men do not work and not so much economic conditions.

The Welfare State. Some researchers focus specifically on what they believe is an overly generous and easily accessible welfare and disability system as a cause of the increase in the share leaving the labor force. Growth in use of disability is particularly striking, even if we cannot fully measure it because the government does not track all the sources of disability payments, public and private. We do know that use of the largest disability program, Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), has grown dramatically. The total number of workers in America was 2.5 times larger in 2021 than in 1960, but the number of people on SSDI who qualified as workers was 17 times larger in 2021 than in 1960.²¹ From 2000 to 2021, the total number of workers was up about 13 percent, but the number on SSDI was up 56 percent, though the number is down somewhat since the height of the Great Recession. Eberstadt observes that disability programs are, “increasingly used as income-support mechanisms for men on a work-free life track”.

Immigration. Direct competition with immigrants likely has also contributed to the rising numbers leaving the labor force. In a prior analysis, we found that the fall-off in immigration in the first three years of the Trump administration, before Covid, coincided with an increase in wages and labor force participation for less-educated, U.S.-born Americans relative to the higher period of immigration in the prior two decades. The National Academies’ comprehensive 2016 study found that immigration reduces wages for some U.S.-born workers, which almost certainly undermines work incentives. A 2019 CIS analysis of EEOC discrimination cases found that immigrants can be used to replace U.S-born workers. Other research has found a negative impact on the employment of young, U.S.-born workers, while more than one study has found a negative impact on the employment of Black Americans from immigration.

Several recent academic papers show that the arrival of immigrants in an area tends to cause the U.S.-born to move out, likely to avoid competition. Perhaps as important as direct competition between the U.S.-born and foreign-born is that the availability of immigrant labor allows policy-makers, business groups, and American society in general to ignore all those on the economic sidelines and the resulting social problems.

Other Possible Causes. It has long been known that having a criminal record significantly reduces one’s employment prospects. There is good reason to think the dramatic increase in the share of less-educated men with a criminal record in recent decades has significantly impeded the willingness of employers to hire them, particularly African-American men. There is also evidence that in addition to being caused by dropping out of the labor force, addiction itself reduces labor force participation. One factor that can be ruled out as a cause of the deteriorating participation in the labor force is population aging. Some research includes the elderly in its analysis and then identifies population aging as a cause of declining participation. But aging cannot really explain the increasing share of working-age people not in the labor force. As Figure 6 shows, the long-term growth in the share not in the labor force is very pronounced even among relatively young, less-educated men (25 to 34).²² We can also know that less-educated men are not increasingly assuming household responsibilities, such as childcare, rather than working. Fewer men are fathers now than in the past, and fewer fathers live with children. Moreover, the time utilization survey shows that men not in the labor force, unlike women, spend relatively little time caring for others. Rather, these men report they spend much of their time watching TV, socializing, relaxing, and other leisure activities.

Conclusion

The findings of this analysis confirm prior research showing a six-decade-long increase in the share of working-age men not in the labor force. Unlike most research on this issue, we break out immigrants and the U.S-born separately going back decades. The share not in the labor force of the working-age, not working or looking for work, rose for both U.S.-born and foreign-born men from 1960 to 1980, but since 1980 the rate has not continued to climb for immigrant men in the way that it has for the U.S.-born. The dramatic increase among those not in the labor force for U.S.-born men means there is now a huge number of potential workers on the economic sidelines who are out of the labor force entirely but are not counted among the unemployed because they have not looked for a job in the four weeks prior to being surveyed. The total number of U.S.-born men and women ages 16 to 64 not in the labor force was 43 million in April 2024, 8.5 million more than in in April 2000. This does not include the 4.4 million natives unemployed who are not working but are considered part of the labor force. It also does not include the roughly 11 million working-age immigrants not in the labor force or unemployed.

The rise in those leaving the labor force is primarily confined to those without a college education. The data also shows an increase for these less-educated, U.S.-born men no matter how “working-age” is defined — 16 to 64, 18 to 64, 25 to 64, or even only those of “prime age”, 25 to 54. Confining the analysis to only the working-age means the increase in the percentage not in the labor force has nothing to do with the growing share of the U.S. population that is over age 65. In fact, we show that the long-term growth for relatively young (25 to 34) U.S.-born men without a bachelor’s degree is very large. Among less-educated U.S.-born women, the share not in the labor force has gone up some since 2000, though it has been better post-Covid. In addition, the share of less-educated immigrant men not in the labor force has also increased since 2006, though the increase is not as large as for less-educated, U.S.-born men.

We summarize in this report the much-debated reasons for the increasing share of less-educated people not in the labor force. It is likely that many factors have contributed to this situation, including low wages, prior criminal convictions, ease of access to welfare and disability programs, competition with immigrants, and changing values and norms about the importance of work. However, while there is no agreement on what has caused the share not in the labor force to increase, there is agreement that the deterioration is associated with a host of serious social problems. These include, but are not limited to, substance abuse, crime, overdose deaths, suicide, obesity, welfare dependence, and social isolation, to say nothing of the fiscal and economic costs of having a larger share of working-age people not in the labor force.

The growth of those not in the labor force means there is huge pool of working-age people from which employers could potentially draw to fill jobs. If labor force participation for U.S.-born men and women together returned to the peak years of 1960 for men and 2000 for women, it would add a total of 9.9 million people to the labor force. Even if the participation rate only returned to the 2000 rate, it would still add 4.4 million U.S.-born men and 900,000 women to the labor force. This is germane to the immigration debate because one of the primary justifications for large-scale legal immigration, and even tolerating illegal immigration, is that there are not enough people to fill all the jobs available. But to make that argument one has to ignore the enormous number of working-age U.S.-born men and women not in the labor force and all the problems this creates for society.

Trying to draw significantly more working-age men, and to some extent women, into the labor market will certainly not be quick or easy. It will involve the difficult task of reforming our welfare and disability systems, combating the opioid and mental health crises, improving job training, and reexamining our approach to globalization. Allowing wages and benefits to rise, partly by reducing immigration, is almost certainly a key part of the solution. Perhaps most challenging, we will need to figure out how to re-instill the value of work.

We are certainly much less likely to undertake needed reforms if we continue to keep the level of legal immigration very high and tolerate widespread illegal immigration. The business community, policymakers, and society in general have much less incentive to deal with the huge share of the working-age population out of the labor force if we can continue to simply turn to immigrants to fill jobs. We have a choice as a country: We can either adopt policies designed to get more working-age Americans currently on the economic sidelines into jobs or we can ignore the problem and continue to bring in ever more immigrants and then try to manage all the pathologies associated with our higher rate of the working-age not in the labor force.

End Notes

¹ When this report was written, the July 2024 Current Population Survey was available and it showed 7.7 million unemployed immigrants and U.S.-born Americans. However, this report uses the April data because historical censuses are collected in April of each year and the decennial census is the only source of data before 1994 that provides information on employment by nativity. Using April CPS data essentially controls for seasonality in the data. In April 2024 there were 5.9 million unemployed immigrants and natives.

² The standard unemployment rate using the monthly CPS is calculated by dividing the number of people actively looking for work in the last four weeks by the number in the labor force (working or looking). Because of the way it is calculated, those not in the labor force are not included in the official unemployment rate. This means that the number of working-age people not working at any one time is dramatically larger than the number who are officially considered unemployed.

³ Because the CPS only began to ask about citizenship in 1994 on a regular basis, we cannot really use the survey to measure employment by nativity before that year. In order to measure long-term trends in employment by nativity, we use the decennial census in earlier years. While this allows us to divide the population by nativity back to 1960, we are limited to the years of the census.

⁴ Looking at the monthly data, it seems employment peaked in 1979 and 1989, not the year of the census, though it was not that much lower in 1980 and 1990. Using the census still gives a pretty clear picture of the long-term decline at the peak of each business cycle along with nativity data.

⁵ We use the April CPS to create continuity with the decennial census, which is also collected in that month. While the figures in this report are not seasonally adjusted, we are looking at the same month each year, which should do a good job of controlling for seasonality. We use unadjusted numbers because such numbers are conceptually simpler and easier for other researchers to replicate. Moreover, we are comparing CPS data and decennial census data in this report and the census is not seasonally adjusted. Also, the limited number of statistics on the foreign-born published in the BLS monthly "Employment Situation" (Table A-7) reports are, like those reported here, not seasonally adjusted. The counts and percentages, particularly for the sub-populations we report based on the CPS will, in some cases, be slightly different from published BLS reports. The reason is that the Census Bureau adds "perturbations" to the public-use microdata to protect respondent confidentiality. Fortunately, the Census Bureau states that any differences between published figures and those calculated from the public-use data will be so small that they "fall well within the sampling variability associated with CPS estimates".

⁶ The term “immigrant” has a specific meaning in U.S. immigration law, which is all those inspected and admitted as lawful permanent residents. In this analysis, we use the term “immigrant” in the non-technical sense of the word to mean all those who were not U.S. citizens at birth. Typically, the government refers to these individuals in surveys such as the CPS or decennial censuses as the “foreign-born”. While it may surprise some, the BLS is clear that illegal immigrants are included in the survey, and the Census Bureau is equally clear that illegal immigrants are included in the census every 10 years, though in both cases some fraction are missed. Although there is some undercount, immigrants, or the foreign-born, in the CPS and decennial census include naturalized citizens, legal permanent residents (green card holders), long-term temporary visitors (e.g. guestworkers), and illegal immigrants.

⁷ Average total personal income in the 2024 Current Population Survey ASEC for men 20 to 64 who were in the labor force was $86,836, compared to only $23,154 for men in this age group not in the labor force. Moreover, 4.8 percent of men 20 to 64 in the labor force lived in poverty, based on this same data, compared to 28.1 percent who were not in the labor force.

⁸ For example, using the 2024 CPS ASEC we find that for households in which all persons are under age 65, but no one works, they pay on average $2,968 in federal income tax, compared to an average of $15,546 in households where all persons are under age 65, but at least one person works. Further, if we use the same data to look just at the biggest welfare programs (SSI, TANF, SNAP, public/rent subsidized housing, and Medicaid) and again confine the analysis to only households where everyone is under 65, it shows that, for households with no workers, 58.5 percent receive at least one of these programs compared to 23.3 percent for households where at least one person works.

⁹ We use 1962 as the starting date because that is the first year that the Ipums website has data for the CPS ASEC.

¹⁰ The Excel files (Figures 9 through 32) that accompany a prior analysis show employment patterns since 2000 by detailed education levels for the U.S.-born by gender and race.

¹¹ Figure 4 and the Excel sheets from 2002 onward report numbers for Black and white respondents who chose only one race.

¹² It should also be pointed out that of the18.5 million working-age, U.S.-born men not in the labor force in April of this year, 86 percent did not have a bachelor’s degree. If we confine the analysis to only prime-age men, it is still the case that 80 percent of those out of the labor market do not have a bachelor’s degree. The huge pool of potential male labor in the country is disproportionately less educated.

¹³ When thinking about this number, it is important to note both the change in labor force participation and the overall growth in the U.S.-born population. That is, an increasingly smaller share of an ever-larger total number that is in the labor force.

¹⁴ Unlike the U.S.-born population, which grows from within the country in a more predictable fashion, the immigrant population does not reproduce itself in the United States — all children born to immigrants are by definition native-born. For example, in 1960 the average male immigrant ages 16 to 64 (in and out of the labor force) was 45.8 years old, compared to 36.7 years old in 1980 and 36.2 years old in 1990. Second, 48.4 percent of working-age male immigrants were 50 and older in 1960, compared to 21.1 percent in 1980 and 17.3 percent in 1990. Age can impact participation rates. However, it should also be pointed out that the more detailed analysis reported in the Excel file (Tab 2) shows that when the analysis is confined to only male immigrants 25 to 34, we still see the same decline from 1960 to 1980. Other possible explanations for the decline include the change in the primary sending countries from Europe to Latin America and Asia, and resulting relative decline in educational attainment of immigrants. Additional analysis would be necessary to determine what factor or factors caused the increase in the share not in the labor force among immigrant men from 1960 to 1980. Of course, perhaps no immigrant-specific explanation is really needed since the increase of those not in the labor force occurred for U.S.-born men over this time period as well. Rather, perhaps the real question is why the increase did not continue as it did for the U.S.-born.

¹⁵ Compares number of immigrants in the labor force in 2010 to the number in 2024. All of these figures are for the working-age, ages 16 to 64, and do not include the modest number of immigrant workers over age 65.

¹⁶ Also in 1994 there seems to be a break in the continuity of the data, with an increase in the share not in the labor force that does not correspond to a recession, though of course employment and related statistics are always a lagging indicator of a downturn. The BLS states that, “The 1994 redesign was to improve the overall quality of labor market information through extensive question changes and the introduction of computers into the collection procedures.” The survey redesign and the new questions may help to explain the seemingly sudden change.

¹⁷ We see the same general pattern if we look only at the total number of employed people with just a high school education — an increase in the number employed from the 1960s to 2006, and then a decline thereafter.

¹⁸ Skill-biased technological change can be defined as any economic change resulting from new technologies that increase demand for more-skilled or educated workers relative to less-skilled, less-educated workers.

¹⁹ Figures are not just for those 16 to 64 and include those 65 and older.

²⁰ There was a recovery in the overall number of less-educated men in the labor force so that there were somewhat more in the labor force by 2013 than there had been in 2006, but by the time of the next peak in the business cycle in 2019, that number had declined and was below the peak in 2006. This reflects the general increase in education of the population and the increasing number and share of jobs done by those with a bachelor’s or more.

²¹ These figures are only for those who themselves qualified for the program because they worked at some point in their lives. Some people on disability do work, but most do not because they are unable to do so and because there are significant limits on how much they are allowed to earn and still qualify for benefits.

²² If we look at those 25 to 34, we also see very roughly the same rise in the share not in the labor force and the same is true of young people 16 to 24.