On Thursday, many Americans learned for the first time that the European Union (EU) shares a land border with Africa as 49,000 (mainly Moroccan male) migrants poured into Ceuta, a Spanish exclave on the south side of the Strait of Gibraltar that on Wednesday had a population of 83,500. Understanding why they came highlights the importance of Mullin v. Al Otro Lado (Spanish, ironically, for “the other side”), the most important U.S. Supreme Court case this last term that most people missed.
Migrants are swimming from Morocco to Ceuta, Spain's EU border in North Africa, as residents express concern over the territory's ability to absorb the influx, amid legal requirements for authorities to follow procedures before deportation https://t.co/Y8N6S83dVB pic.twitter.com/HvrITioGF6
— Reuters (@Reuters) July 31, 2026
A Brief History of Two Spanish Exclaves on the African Coast
Actually, the EU shares two land borders with Africa, both Spanish exclaves (and enclaves): one Ceuta (“Sebtah” to the Moroccans) and the other Melilla (called “Melilah” by Morocco).
The former was the launchpad for the Islamic invasion of the Iberian peninsula in the 8th century (which began a Muslim occupation that continued in places for nearly 800 years), and ironically, each was subsequently conquered during the Reconquista that ended Muslim rule: Melilla by Spanish captains in 1494 (it was annexed to Spain in 1556); and Ceuta by the Portuguese in 1415, who transferred it to Spain in 1661.
Spain kept the two exclaves even after Morocco gained its independence (from French and Spanish “protectorates”, a complicated story for another day) in 1956, and as the BBC has noted: “For the Muslims, Ceuta and Melilla are a painful reminder of Muslim defeat and humiliation by rising Western, Christian powers.”
Two Triggers for the Latest Surge
While I trust that there are those who will credit “root cause” push factors like “violence, food insecurity, severe poverty, corruption, climate change, the continuing effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, and dire economic conditions” for the Ceuta surge, two “pull factors” – both firmly rooted in Spain and drawing the migrants to the EU – were the more likely triggers.
The first is an amnesty that Spain’s Socialist prime minister, Pedro Sánchez, finalized in April, which drew 1.17 million applications from migrants who claimed they were in Spain on January 1, 2026, and who had lived there for at least five months prior to that date.
That was “double the government's initial estimate of 500,000” applications.
Applicants who meet the amnesty’s requirements (nearly 610,000 were approved by July 2; more are in the queue) will receive one-year residency permits that can be converted into “other work or residency permits” thereafter.
The window for that amnesty closed on June 30, but: (1) smugglers rarely highlight the fine print when hawking illicit journeys; and (2), would-be “irregular migrants” wouldn’t read it anyway because, as the Center has explained many times in the past, amnesties inevitably trigger fresh waves of illegal entries because they reveal governments don’t take their immigration laws seriously.
The July 8 Decision of the Spanish Supreme Court
The second reason why tens of thousands of migrants are pouring into Ceuta – most by sea – has to do with a decision issued by the Spanish Supreme Court on July 8, barring “hot returns” (“devoluciones en caliente”) of migrants attempting to swim into the two exclaves.
By way of background, in 2015, Spain approved an Organic Law on Public Security, which EJIL: Talk! notes added a Tenth Additional Provision to Spain’s Aliens Law, described as “rechazo en frontera” (rejection at the border). It provides that “foreign nationals detected at the perimeter while attempting to enter Spain irregularly may be rejected in order to prevent their unlawful entry into Spanish territory.”
EJIL Talk! continues, explaining that the case before the Spanish Supreme Court:
concerned the application of this procedure to migrants intercepted in the water while attempting to swim to Ceuta. At its core, the dispute turned on whether the Tenth Additional Provision of the Aliens Law applies to migrants intercepted in such circumstances.
The court concluded that the law only applied to “containment elements” (“physical obstacles designed to prevent entry”), and that the “maritime boundary cannot be regarded as a containment element”. Consequently, rechazo en frontera didn’t apply to those who swam to Spain – or its exclaves.
Not surprisingly, the Spanish government quickly blamed the disaster on Thursday – in which 19 drowned – on the court’s decision.
Al Otro Lado
With that in mind, consider the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Al Otro Lado, which was handed down just four days before its Spanish counterpart issued its “rejection at the border” decision.
On its face, that opinion stands for the proposition that an alien on the perimeter of the United States – just feet from the international boundary – has not “arrived in” this country and thus has no right to be allowed to enter to apply for asylum.
As I explained days after Al Otro Lado was issued, however, the case actually answered a larger and more important question that was hotly debated during the Biden administration: What obligations does the asylum statute, section 208(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), impose on DHS when it comes to allowing illegal aliens into the United States, and consequently what force can immigration officers use to keep “asylum seekers” on the perimeter from entering the United States illegally?
Justice Alito, writing for the majority, concluded that section 208(a)(1) imposes no obligation on DHS or the U.S. government as a whole to usher any alien who is not already within our borders into the United States, and thus implicitly the department can use whatever force is reasonable to keep them out.
CBP under Biden interpreted our law as the justices of the Spanish Supreme Court interpreted theirs, which is why it concluded it was required to tear out temporary concertina wire barriers the state of Texas had erected on the banks of the Rio Grande.
Arguably, those “c-wire” emplacements were no more “containment elements” than the riverbank itself, which is why Biden’s CBP chased away the Texas state troopers manning them and why Biden’s DOJ later sued Texas to remove “floating buoys” the state placed in the river itself, which were passable, albeit with some difficulty.
Of course, that opinion is only as impactful as the administration that controls our border: without the willingness to keep migrants from transiting the Rio Grande – with barriers, a show of force, or force itself – nothing keeps them from crossing the watery “perimeter” of the United States into the interior, at which point the asylum laws apply.
D.C. grandees can learn a few lessons from the Ceuta migrant disaster, most notably that amnesty is not a serious response to illegal immigration. That said, the justices of the Spanish Supreme Court can learn a few lessons about maritime borders from their colleagues on “the other side” of the Atlantic, as well.