On November 24, President Trump issued an executive order (EO) titled “Designation of Certain Muslim Brotherhood Chapters as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists”, which “set[] in motion a process by which certain chapters or other subdivisions of the Muslim Brotherhood [MB] shall be considered for designation as Foreign Terrorist Organizations [FTO]”, as provided in section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and “as specially designated global terrorists, consistent with [the International Emergency Economic Powers Act] (50 U.S.C. 1702), and EO 13224”.
President Trump’s EO is a welcome executive action that should have been taken a decade ago. On November 3, 2015, during the Obama administration, U.S. Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart (R-Fla.) introduced H.R. 3892, the “Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act of 2015”, declaring it the sense of Congress that “the Muslim Brotherhood meets the criteria for designation as a [FTO] under section 219 … and … the Secretary of State [SOS] … should … designat[e] the … Brotherhood as a [FTO].” Rep. Diaz-Balart’s bill noted that the governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates had already taken similar actions. On February 24, 2016, the House Judiciary Committee under Chairman Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.) voted to advance Rep. Diaz-Balart’s legislation to the full House of Representatives. The House Republican Leadership failed to bring the bill to the House floor for a vote.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s Threat: “Jihad Is Our Way”
As H.R. 3892 explained, the Muslim Brotherhood “was founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna”. It went on to state that:
In its earliest days, the Egyptian [MB] established a terrorist wing, referred to as the “secret apparatus”, which conducted bombings and assassinations targeting foreigners and government officials. The assassinations … of Judge Ahmed Al-Khazinder Bey in 1947 and Prime Minister Mahmoud Al-Nuqrashi in 1948 prompted the first ban on the organization in Egypt.
As to the MB’s pernicious nature, the bill explained that:
The [MB]’s long-standing motto includes … [“]Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope[.]”
Hassan al-Banna, in … “The Way of Jihad”, taught—
- “Jihad is an obligation from Allah on every Muslim and cannot be ignored nor evaded. Allah has ascribed great importance to jihad and has made the reward of the martyrs and fighters in His way a splendid one. Only those who have acted similarly and who have modeled themselves upon the martyrs in their performance of jihad can join them in this reward.”; and
- “Jihad [means] the fighting of the unbelievers, and involves all possible efforts that are necessary to dismantle the power of the enemies of Islam including beating them, plundering their wealth, destroying their places of worship and smashing their idols.”
Hassan al-Banna also taught that “it is the nature of Islam to dominate, not to be dominated”, and thus that the mission of Islam, as interpreted and executed by the [MB], must be “to impose [Islamic] law on nations and to extend its power to the entire planet”. … [A]l-Banna’s plan for accomplishing this mission … centrally incorporated training for and the execution of violent jihad-terrorist operations.
The bill referenced the MB’s targeting of Christians in Egypt:
The August 14, 2013, clearing of [MB] protests in Egypt resulted in attacks by [MB] supporters targeting the Coptic Christian community … [i]nclud[ing] 70 churches and more than 1,000 homes and businesses … torched. … [T]here were repeated reports of direct incitement towards the Copts from leading [MB] figures, and … this targeting … continues in official statements on [MB] social media outlets and from its leadership. As the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom has previously noted, this terror campaign by the [MB] is not a new development. Over the past decade violence by the [MB] has been directed at the Coptic community. As the USCIRF observed in its 2003 Annual Report: ‘‘Coptic Christians face ongoing violence from vigilante Muslim extremists, including members of the [MB], many of whom act with impunity.’’
The bill cited Richard P. Mitchell’s history of the MB, which “explained al-Banna’s teachings on violent jihad”:
Death, as an important end of jihad, was extolled by al-Banna in a phrase which came to be a famous part of his legacy: “[T]he art of death”. “Death is art”. The Koran has commanded people to love death more than life. Unless “the philosophy of the Koran on death” replaces “the love of life” which has consumed Muslims, then they will reach naught. Victory can only come with the mastery of “the art of death”. The movement cannot succeed, al-Banna insists, without this dedicated and unqualified kind of jihad.
Professor Mitchell observed that … “If the Muslim Brothers were more effectively violent than other groups on the Egyptian scene, it was because militancy and martyrdom had been elevated to central virtues in [its] ethos.”
It then noted that “In [MB] organizations and chapters throughout the world, including in the United States, al-Banna’s originating philosophy continues to be taught.”
As to the impact of the MB on the United States, H.R. 3892 stated that:
The United States has previously designated global elements of the [MB] as foreign terrorist organizations, including … Hamas, which self-identifies as “one of the wings of the [MB] in Palestine” … [and] the Kuwaiti [MB]’s Lajnat al-Daawa al-Islamiya … designated for … being a financial conduit for Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda … funding terrorist groups in Chechnya and Libya; and … including Al-Qaeda operations chief Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef as leaders.
Individual [MB] leaders have been designated by the United States as Specially Designated Terrorists … including Shaykh Abd-al-Majid Al-Zindani, a leader of the Yemeni [MB]’s Al-Islah political party. … The designation states that al Zindani has a “long history of working with Bin Laden, serving as one of his spiritual leaders”, in addition to his activities in support of Al-Qaeda, including recruiting and procuring weapons. Al Zindani was also identified in a Federal lawsuit as a coordinator of the October 2000 suicide attack targeting the USS COLE in Aden, Yemen, that killed 17 United States Navy sailors.
Mohammad Jamal Khalifa … senior [MB] leader, and brother-in-law and close confidant of Osama bin Laden was arrested in California … on charges related to the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. Evidence was found … that linked Khalifa to the planned al Qaeda Operation Bojinka plot that included the bombing of 11 airplanes between Asia and the United States … . [H]e operated an Islamic charity in the Philippines that was accused of funneling money to the Abu Sayyef terrorist group and laundering money for Bin Laden.
Sami Al-Hajj, an Al-Qaeda member and senior leader of the [MB]’s Shura Council, was imprisoned as a detainee at the Department of Defense facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba … for his work as a money and weapons courier for Al-Qaeda.
According to a May 1995 report by the United States House of Representatives Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, a series of conferences hosted by Sudanese [MB] leader Hassan al-Turabi in Khartoum, Sudan, during October 1994 and March to April 1995 featured representatives from virtually every Islamic terrorist organization in the world … [i]nclud[ing] … Iranian intelligence, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Egyptian Islamic Jihad … and leaders from the international [MB] … Hamas. … Osama bin Laden was present. … The parties agreed to launch a terrorism offensive beginning in 1995, with targets including United States interests and personnel in the Middle East and attacks inside the United States homeland.
In the Holy Land Foundation prosecutions — the largest terrorism financing trial in United States history — Department of Justice [DOJ] officials successfully argued in court that the international [MB] and its United States affiliates had engaged in a widespread conspiracy to raise money and materially support the terrorist group Hamas. HLF officials charged in the case were found guilty on all counts in November 2008, primarily related to millions of dollars that had been transferred to Hamas. During the trial and in court documents, Federal prosecutors implicated a number of prominent United States-Islamic organizations in this conspiracy. … These groups and their leaders … were named as unindicted co-conspirators in the case. DOJ told the court that the[y] … acted at the direction of the international [MB] to support terrorism. … [“]Shortly after HAMAS was founded in 1987, as an outgrowth of the [MB], the International [MB] ordered [its] chapters throughout the world to create Palestine Committees, who supported HAMAS with ‘media, money and men’. The U.S.-[MB] created the U.S. Palestine Committee … [with t]he mandate … to support HAMAS.
In September 2010, the Supreme Guide of the [MB], Mohamed Badie … declared that ‘‘Resistance is the only solution against the Zio-American arrogance and tyranny[]’’ and that “the improvement and change that the [Muslim] nation seeks can only be attained through jihad and sacrifice and by raising a jihadi generation that pursues death just as the enemies pursue life’’.
President Trump’s EO added that:
[The MB’s] chapters in Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt engage in or facilitate and support violence and destabilization campaigns that harm their own regions, United States citizens, and United States interests. … [I]n the aftermath of [Hamas’] October 7, 2023[ massacre] in Israel … the [MB’s] Lebanese chapter … joined Hamas[ and] Hezbollah … to launch multiple rocket attacks … within Israel[ and a] senior leader of the Egyptian chapter … called for violent attacks against United States partners and interests, and Jordanian [MB] leaders have long provided material support to … Hamas.
The EO further declared U.S. policy to be “to eliminate the capabilities and operations of [MB] chapters designated as [FTOs] … deprive those chapters of resources, and thereby end any threat” they pose to U.S. nationals or U.S. national security.
Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations Under the Immigration and Nationality Act
Section 219 of the INA was enacted as part of the “Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996”. It provides that:
The [SOS] is authorized to designate an organization as a foreign terrorist organization … if the Secretary finds that—
(A) the organization is a foreign organization;
(B) the organization engages in terrorist activity (as defined in [INA] section 212(a)(3)(B) … or terrorism (as defined in section 2656f(d)(2) of title 22), or retains the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism); and
(C) the terrorist activity or terrorism of the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States.
President Trump’s EO requires that:
Within 30 days … the [SOS] and the Secretary of the Treasury [SOT], after consultation with the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit a joint report to the President … concerning the designation of any [MB] chapters or other subdivisions, including those in Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt, as [FTOs] and specially designated global terrorists.
Within 45 days of submitting the report … the [SOS] or the [SOT], as applicable, shall take all appropriate action … with regard to the designation of any … chapters or other subdivisions … as [FTOs] and specially designated global terrorists.
Effect of Designation
Immigration Consequences
The immigration consequences of a group’s designation as an FTO under § 219 are now much less significant than they were following the enactment of ATEDPA. This is not because the law has grown weaker over the intervening years, rather the law has grown stronger. In the aftermath of 9/11, House Judiciary Committee Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (R-Wis.) was able to secure in the “USA PATRIOT Act of 2001” and the “REAL ID Act of 2005” provisions dramatically strengthening the terrorism-related grounds of inadmissibility (for aliens not present in the U.S. or who entered without authorization) and deportability (for aliens who have been admitted to the U.S.). Among these were provisions largely equalizing the immigration consequences of aliens’ actions related to foreign terrorist organization, regardless of whether such organizations have been designated through the section 219 process.
Following the effective dates of ATEDPA and the “Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996” (IIRIRA), any alien who was “a representative … of a [FTO], as designated … under section [219], or … a member of a [FTO], as designated … which the alien knows or should have known is a terrorist organization”, was inadmissible. In addition, any alien who “solicit[ed] funds or other things of value for” or “solicit[ed] any individual for membership in” any terrorist organization was inadmissible/deportable.
Currently, the grounds of inadmissibility and deportability cover representatives of any “terrorist organization[s]”, members of designated terrorist organizations, and members of non-designated terrorist organizations (unless, for non-designated organizations, “the alien can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alien did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization”). Aliens who solicit funds or other things of value for a designated FTO are inadmissible/deportable, as they are regarding non-designated terrorist organizations unless they “can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence” that they “did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization”.
And importantly, aliens who commit acts that they know, or reasonably should know, afford material support to/for a designated [FTO] or a member of such organization are now inadmissible and deportable — as they are regarding non-designated organizations unless they “can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence” that they “did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization”.
Freezing of Assets
Section 219 provides that:
Upon notification [of the SOS’s intent to designate a FTO] … the [SOT] may require United States financial institutions possessing or controlling any assets of any foreign organization included in the notification to block all financial transactions involving those assets until further directive from either the [SOT], Act of Congress, or order of court.
And Section 2339B of title 18 provides that:
Except as authorized by the [SOT], any financial institution that becomes aware that it has possession of, or control over, any funds in which a [FTO designated under section 219], or its agent, has an interest, shall—
(A) retain possession of, or maintain control over, such funds; and
(B) report to the [SOT] the existence of such funds in accordance with regulations issued by the [SOT].
Any financial institution that knowingly fails to comply … shall be subject to a civil penalty in an amount that is the greater of—
(A) $50,000 per violation; or
(B) twice the amount of which the financial institution was required … to retain possession or control.
Criminal Material Support
Section 2339B also provides that:
Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined … or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and, if the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. To violate this paragraph, a person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization [under § 219], that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the [INA]), or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989).