Media
Event Summary
A recent U.S. Supreme Court decision addressing birthright citizenship has renewed debate over one of the most consequential questions in immigration policy for any nation: Who should be entitled to citizenship?
To examine the current state of citizenship policy, especially as it relates to immigration, the International Network for Immigration Research (INIR) held a panel discussion featuring policy experts from the United States, France, Israel, and Hungary, hosted by the Center for Immigration Studies. The panel explored how different democracies define citizenship, the historical development of their laws, and the policy choices that shape them today.
While the United States has long interpreted the 14th Amendment to confer citizenship broadly on nearly all children born on U.S. soil, many countries have adopted different approaches. Some place greater emphasis on parental citizenship, while others have modified their laws over time; France, for example, revised its citizenship laws in the 1990s to move away from automatic citizenship at birth.
Panelists
Pawel Styrna, Director of International Relations, Federation for American Immigration Reform, Washington, D.C.
Nicolas Pouvreau-Monti, Executive Director of the Immigration and Demography Observatory (OID), Paris
Yonatan Jakubowicz, Executive Director of the Israeli Immigration Policy Center, Jerusalem.
Viktor Marsai, Executive Director of the Migration Research Institute, Budapest
Moderator: Mark Krikorian, Executive Director, Center for Immigration Studies, Washington, D.C.
Date and Location
July 28, 2026
Washington, DC
MARK KRIKORIAN: The first three words of the U.S. Constitution are “We the People,” but it doesn’t say who “We the People” are. And so this is a fundamental question today in a democracy. In the old days, the king was the sovereign. It didn’t really matter who the people were, other than his ability to tax them. Today, it matters. The people in a modern democracy are the sovereign, and so who makes up “the people” matters.
My name is Mark Krikorian. I’m executive director of the Center for Immigration Studies. And we’ve convened under the auspices of the International Network for Immigration Research, I-N-I-R – INIR, we call it – a discussion with experts from a number of countries around the world, members of our network, to address this issue of citizenship, especially with the connection it has with immigration.
Not to have Latin right at the beginning of our panel, but there are two approaches and there are Latin terms for each one. One is “jus soli,” the “law of the soil;” the other is “jus sanguinis,” the law of blood. And to simplify it – because it’s never quite totally simple, but to simplify it – it means members of we the people are those who are physically on the soil of the country versus we the people being those who are ethnically connected to that nation.
The reason we’re having this discussion, of course, is because the U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled that the current practice of the United States in giving citizenship to children – all children born in the United States, that that is a constitutional right. There are – it’s probably the most extreme version of this jus soli, of automatic birthright citizenship, that exists in the world. And it relates to immigration, obviously, because what it means is that the children of illegal immigrants, of visa overstayers, of tourists, foreign students, foreign workers, even most diplomatic staff, if they have kids here their kids are U.S. citizens.
And in addressing this issue, it matters to understand what other countries do in this regard as well. And so that’s why CIS, under the auspices of INIR, has put together this panel discussion, and we have four experts from four different countries to address this issue.
Before I introduce them briefly, if you have questions send them – email them to [email protected] – that’s [email protected] – and we’ll try to get to as many of the questions as we can during our one hour together.
The first speaker is going to be Pawel Styrna, who is the director of international relations at the Federation for American Immigration Reform – FAIR – here in Washington, talking about the U.S. side of it: What was the Supreme Court decision? What is current U.S. policy?
But to give us some context for the rest of the world, we’re then going to move to Yonatan Jakubowicz, who runs the Israeli Immigration Policy Center in Jerusalem. And Israel, of course, has a very different legal immigration policy from the United States. It mostly involves diaspora immigration. But, like every modern developed country, Israel also faces illegal immigration – tourists who overstay, people who sneak across the border, that sort of thing; foreign workers, even – and so it’s a relevant issue to hear about how Israel deals with the issue of children born to people who are immigrants or foreigners in one way or another.
Next, we’re going to talk to Nicolas Pouvreau-Monti, who runs the immigration – the Immigration and Demography Observatory. Sorry; I keep thinking of the French version of it, and I confuse it with the English. The French initials are OID. And France actually has a policy of immigration somewhat more similar to that of the United States, but has changed its birthright citizenship rules in the past few decades. And so there’s something there for U.S. policymakers to think about.
And then, last but not least, Viktor Marsai, who runs the Migration Research Institute in Budapest, is going to talk not only about the way Hungary deals with this issue but also sort of more generally what is the trend in Europe more broadly with regard to this issue of birthright citizenship.
So, like I said, if you have questions, we’ll deal with those afterwards, after the presentations. Send your questions to [email protected]. Obviously, if you’re watching the recording of this it’s too late for that. But if you’re watching the stream, you can do that.
And let us start with Pawel. You’re up.
PAWEL STYRNA: Well, great. Thank you, Mark. I’d like to preface all of this by – just with the disclaimer that I am not a lawyer, but I do have to talk about the legal aspects, all of this, because we are, after all, talking about the Trump v. Barbara case in the Supreme Court decided on June 30th. And I think I’m not the only one who believes that that is a horrible ruling for so many reasons.
One, it just perpetuates bad law, bad policy. It poses a threat to our national sovereignty, to our security, to our national cohesion. It adds to a huge fiscal burden on our taxpaying citizens, who really – who had this foisted upon them against or despite their will. Violates basic common sense. And most important of all, I’d say, is it rewards illegal immigration and rewards birth tourism.
So, first, let’s talk about the legal side of this. The debate about birthright citizenship goes back – keeps circling back to the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. That was passed in 1868, right after the Civil War. Before that, from the birth of the American republic till the Civil War, the rules on citizenship were not super clear-cut. They varied on a state-by-state basis a bit. And people were citizens of their state first, and after that of the United States. So you’d be a citizen of Virginia, and by nature of that a citizen of the United States as well. The main principle was that of jus soli from the beginning. However, it was restricted. So, based on the 1790 Naturalization Act, citizenship was reserved for, quote/unquote, “free White persons of good moral character.” Black Americans were excluded, as reinforced by the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision in 1857. American Indians or Native Americans were excluded as well.
And then we get to the Civil War, and the 14th Amendment is passed in 1868, and it awards citizenship to the Black ex-slaves freed as a result of that conflict. And Section 1 of the amendment states, quote, “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.” So all this discussion that we’ve been having since then has been about that phrase, “and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.”
And the authors of the Fifth – I’m sorry, the 14th Amendment didn’t just put that phrase in there just to be verbose. They didn’t just insert that in there to add extra wording. That was – that had a very – that was a legal term of art and had a very important significance for them.
Oregon Senator George Henry Williams clarified at the time, the late 1860s, quote, “In one sense, all persons born within the geographical limits of the United States are subject to the jurisdiction of the U(nited) S(tates), but they are not subject to the jurisdiction of the U(nited) S(tates) in every sense…I understand the word(s) here, ‘subject to the jurisdiction of the U(nited) S(tates),’ to mean fully and completely subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”
Then we had Michigan Senator Jacob M. Howard, who introduced the clause – the citizenship clause – in 1866, who emphasized that his understanding of birthright citizenship, quote, “will not, of course, include persons born in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, who belong to the families of ambassadors or foreign ministers accredited to the Government of the United States.” End quote.
So I would say the legislative intent was pretty clear here. But 30 years later, the 14th Amendment was – really had its first major test, and that was in the Wong Kim Ark case in the Supreme Court. And the court ruled that Wong Kim Ark, who was a U.S.-born – U.S.-born child of Chinese subjects who were living in the United States, that he was – that he was basically legally an American citizen because he was born on U.S. soil. So supporters of giving U.S.-born children of illegal aliens automatic or birthright citizenship point to the Wong Kim Ark case and say: Well, it’s clear-cut. The Supreme Court ruled he was born American soil. He wasn’t a child of diplomats or of invading armies of any of the excluded categories. Therefore, he was a citizen. Clear-cut and simple, right?
Well, not exactly, because the decision stated includes a proviso in there. Quote: “Chinese persons, born out of the United States, remaining subjects of the Emperor of China, and not having become citizens of the United States, are entitled to the protection of, and owe allegiance to, the United States so long as they are permitted by the United States to reside here.” End quote. So, again, you have – you have the equivalent of a legal or permitted residence in the United States.
But in spite of this, the practice of just granting birthright citizenship automatically regardless of immigration status, even to those whose parents were not permitted to reside here, started. It’s unclear when exactly and how it started, but most likely it was a combination of just bureaucratic laziness and inertia and just not wanting to rock the boat. And probably it was – surely there was also the motivation of we need to assimilate these people, just give their kids citizenship and resolve the issue.
But you have another angle here because you had immigration legislation passed throughout the 20th century, most notably the 1924 Immigration Act and you had the 1952 Immigration Act. The 1952 one is the basis of our – well, it is our current immigration law. So that one basically made just this free giveaway of – unconditional giveaway of automatic birthright citizenship to the children of illegals, made it logically untenable because the law was basically saying that illegal presence in the United States is a problem, the law is here to address that issue. So you really have a big contradiction, or even you could say a loophole, in that system – within the system, and it is getting exploited.
Another issue is that of consent when we’re talking about the legal side of things. The majority opinion in Trump v. Barbara, which was written by Chief Justice Roberts, was criticized, including by the dissent, of course. The argument of the dissent is that the majority relied too much on the old English common law understanding of jurisdiction, allegiance, and subjecthood, according to which if you were born on the king’s soil you were his subject, like it or not. The dissenting argument, which includes Justices – Gorsuch, Justice Thomas, pointed out that American – the American notion of citizenship was and America itself was a revolt against British notions of subjecthood at its very core. So, basically, the dissenters pointed out that this overly – old common – old English common law interpretation really doesn’t take into account the notion of the social compact and of the citizens. We, the citizens – it’s a constitutional republic. We have to consent to – we can’t just have millions of foreign nationals forced upon us as citizens, so to speak, without our consent.
Now let’s talk about the threats, because there are a lot of threats, OK? So there’s a threat to national sovereignty, to our national security, and to our cohesion.
So, to begin with, just in principle it’s – granting automatic birthright citizenship to birth tourists, to children of illegal aliens, is an assault on national sovereignty. Why? Well, because we’re basically giving away something as precious as our citizenship to people who decide to violate our borders and laws – well, their children, but still we are rewarding – we are rewarding an assault on our sovereignty. So that doesn’t make sense.
Then, you know, there’s a national security vulnerability. There are lots of countries that mean us ill. We have lots of adversaries in the world. We have Russia. We have China. We have other countries that mean us ill. So if we just freely give away citizenship just because they happen to be – you know, a citizen of China happens to be in the United States on a tourist visa and happens to have a child here, you know, we have to think what happens 20 years later when we have – when this person can potentially be working for the U.S. government and they can potentially – you know, this can lead to espionage or infiltration or influence operations. We really dismiss this problem at our own risk. We really do.
And apart from this targeted risk, there is the problem of a growing population of we could call paperwork Americans, who may be theoretically citizens because of us giving automatic citizenship to the children of illegal aliens but they don’t really have significant allegiance or patriotic devotion to the nation that granted them the citizenship. So many, in fact, may feel resentments towards this country. They may feel that America is being mean to their parents just by enforcing its immigration laws.
And case in point is one – well, there are many such politicians, but one is an open borders Democratic congresswoman who flew to Mexico City last year to a big conference, and she stood up there and she stated, well, “I’m a proud Guatemalan before I’m an American.” So you really have this growing demographic whose allegiance to the United States is questionable because of this policy. So if we wanted a citizen policy designed by our enemies, we can look no further than this.
And then there’s the issue of the fiscal burden. This is – this costs – according to FAIR estimates, illegal immigration costs American citizens approximately 150 billion (dollars) – over 150 billion (dollars) per year. Right now, it’s probably getting closer to 160 billion (dollars). A hundred percent is not – well, not all of that is for the children of illegal aliens, but a big chunk is because they’re able to – as American citizens, they’re able to collect. They qualify for all kinds of welfare benefits and, obviously, free public education. So they do impose a big, big burden on American taxpayers, who, again, had no say in in whether, you know, these newcomers were foisted upon them or not.
So, in conclusion, the Supreme Court passed the – passed the – this was a bad ruling. And President Trump, luckily, wants to rehear the case. He has stated that, but the deadline for submitting the petition passed yesterday. And in any case, the last time the Supreme Court reheard a case and reversed its ruling was in 1956 or 1957. So that’s – it’s possible, but it’s probably not going to happen. So, as bad as the Trump v. Barbara ruling is, it should serve to further underscore the need to have secure borders, enforce our laws, deport illegal aliens, crack down on birth tourism, other types of immigration fraud, because as a serious nation we just – we can’t allow ourselves to be taken advantage of anymore like this. Thank you.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Thank you, Pawel.
Now let’s move to Yonatan. Israel has a very different legal immigration policy, but as I said, as a modern developed nation it does face a lot of the same immigration – illegal immigration challenges. And so I want to hear what – how Israel deals with this issue of children born to illegal immigrants, tourists, overstayers, foreign workers, et cetera. Yonatan? You need to unmute yourself.
YONATAN JAKUBOWICZ: Thank you, Mark.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Great.
MR. JAKUBOWICZ: And thank you, everyone, for having me.
So, yeah, in short, Israel’s main immigration policies are – legal immigration pathways are based on two laws. The first one is the law of return that allows Jews and their descendants to get Israeli citizenship pretty much automatically if they are so interested. Of course, it’s not granted to Jews who are not in Israel, but if they want to immigrate then they can receive citizenship. In a little bit ironic way, develops – you could say that there are complications with that. It may be similar to what you’re seeing in the U.S., because the law was passed mainly to allow Jews to come with their families – so it allows Jews and their children and grandchildren and spouses to come – but today many people who just had one Jewish grandparent come with their whole families, and actually the majority of people of legal immigration are people who are not ethnically Jewish according to that law. And as the years pass by and Israel becomes more developed, we also see people who would not want to come for any kind of ideological or ethnic reasons but just for economic reasons, and because they have that law they come.
The second – the second route is marriage. Any Israeli citizen, no matter his religion, can marry a foreigner and award them. There’s a gradual process, and at the end they can give citizenship – both marriage and also common law marriage. Israel actually has a very liberal policy on common law marriages and citizenship. There were years where it was ahead of most of the world, I’d say, or – ahead or more progressive, however you want to look at it. So that’s the second rule. And that is also – a substantial proportion of people use that route, mostly relatives and spouses of non-Jewish Israeli citizens. But the law is equal.
And then we have – as you stated, Mark, we have the issue of children who are born to migrants who are in Israel, either legally or illegally. When we’re talking about those kind of children who are born in Israel, Israel has no – there is no automatic citizenship. Actually, to say the truth, there’s no – there’s no official legal policy pathway to achieve citizenship at all for someone born in Israel, and it doesn’t matter if it’s legally or illegally if his parent doesn’t have status. I’ll just add that I should have added before that of course children of citizens, no matter their religion, receive automatic citizenship. But that’s if their parents are citizens. But we’re talking about migrants who are in Israel who are not citizens or residents, mostly workers, either migrant workers – Israel has a comparatively high percentage of temporary foreign workers who come illegally – who come legally to work. But a percentage of them overstay their visas, as is – as in all the world, or tourists who overstay their visas, or people who entered illegally cross the border illegally like in any – like in many other countries. So, officially, the legal status of their children in Israel, the law says that the children have the same status as their parents. So if their parents had a – had a worker’s visa at the time they were born, then they’ll have the same level of visa. But of course, it’s temporary. There is no official pathway to citizenship.
What there is, is once somebody receives permanent residency then there’s a gradual way to receive citizenship which is semi-automatic. It takes a few years, but he can update his status to citizenship. But to go from a foreigner who is illegal in Israel or even on a temporary visa legally, or his children or their children, there’s no legal pathway. But what we do see that happens de facto is that every couple of years there’s a new group of migrant – also, I will add that while there’s no legal pathway to achieve residency, at the – the day after his visa ends he can just go up – go and sign his children to public school absolutely free. And so that, of course – and then after a couple of years we see campaigns by people say these children speak Hebrew, they feel Israeli, we cannot – we cannot send them back. Many times, of course, I think it’s very cynical. I mean, we have migrants – we have children of migrant workers who their whole family is in their country of origin, safe countries. Sometimes one of their parents is there, but we still these campaigns. And then what happens is that the government capitulates and gives this group amnesty to that certain group, that number of children. Those children receive permanent resident status, which in time allows them to upgrade to citizenship. And if they do military service before the – before that gradual process so they can get citizenship faster, and their children, their younger – sorry, their younger siblings, if there are, and their parents usually receive temporary residency. And once those children with permanent residency finish their – if they enlist into the army and finish their army service, then their siblings and parents can get permanent residency, and then – it takes a few a few years but it’s almost automatic unless they’re involved in some kind of crime or anything – they can expect to get citizenship.
So, to conclude, there’s no – there’s no legal pathway to do it. And of course, children who are born in Israel don’t automatically get citizenship, but de facto in many such cases that’s what happens even though it does – it does take a long time. It’s not something automatic, not even close to automatic. It could take many years. And it could take many years until it happens, but at the end of the day de facto we can see that that’s what happens.
But I will say that it’s not a simple – it’s not – I’ll just finish with it’s not a simple pathway and the numbers, at least for now, are relatively – I’d say relatively because the situation in many other countries is – and of course, compared to the U.S. The numbers are growing. So I think where – Israel is moving towards your direction, but we’re still a leg back. But I don’t see any plans of changing the law, so it’s not like we see in the near future that they’re going to change the law to make it legal. It’s just the more – the more people migrate, the more people overstay, the more children are born here, and then the more the push to grant them status.
So that’s pretty much an overview of Israel’s immigration laws and pathways for children who are born in Israel.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Thank you, Yonatan.
We’ll now move to Nicolas, which has, as I said – or at least has had a history of immigration somewhat more similar to that of the United States, in that there’s been a lot of immigration to it and it’s not really a diaspora phenomenon with regard to France. But France has, in fact, changed its and tightened up its policies for children born there, and so I really want to hear about that. Nicolas, you’re up.
NICOLAS POUVREAU-MONTI: Well, thank you so much, Mark. And thanks again to the CIS for setting up this online panel.
Well, as you say, France has been one of the leading debate grounds in Europe as regards citizenship reform law. That has, of course, to deal with the growing migration flows that our country has had to receive over the last few years and decades, because the question of citizenship clearly is one of the most serious issues related to uncontrolled migration because migration flows are a thing, but citizenship are even a more important thing because immigration determines who enters a country while citizenship determines who ultimately becomes part of the people – of the sovereign people of a country, who is entitled to own the country as all citizens of a democracy are somehow co-owners of the country.
It’s a topic our organization has been working on – working on a lot over the last few weeks, and we’ll actually be publishing a study on the specific issue of citizenship this fall. We’re trying to answer in this study three main questions which are still not as addressed as they should be in today’s French media and political debate. Even though migration topics are often discussed, citizenship is not as discussed as some other issues even though it has been ongoing for a long time now.
The first question is, how many people have become French over the last years and decades? How did they become French, and who are they? Where do they come from? What are the profiles?
What has to be said first is that we have experienced 25 years of unprecedented expansion of citizenship in France. Since the year 2000, more than 3 million people have acquired French citizenship. So there has been twice as many people acquiring French citizenship in the first quarter of the 21st century as in the last quarter of the 20th century.
There are now three main pathways to acquire French citizenship. One of them – and the most common one, actually – is naturalization by decree. You know, it’s an adult foreign national applying to become French, and then the government, the administration, decides on a case-by-case basis whether to grant citizenship. It is still quite a discretionary decision. Well, in principle there are quite a few standards to be met. Those people have to have lived in France for at least five years. They have to demonstrate some level of economic integration, have no serious criminal convictions, et cetera. So this accounts for around half of those 3 million people who have acquired French citizenship since the turn of this century.
The second pathway, which of course is related a lot to what has been discussed here about the U.S., is some deferred form of jus soli, of birthright citizenship. Unlike in the – in the United States, a child born in France to foreign parents does not automatically become French at birth. There is a level of automaticity, but which applies at the age of 18 provided that the individual has lived in France for the required period during his childhood and teenage years. It may also be claimed earlier if this residency duration prerequisite has been met earlier than the age of 18.
And in the 1980s, as Mark referred to, there was an attempt to tighten up these citizenship laws between 1993 and 1998, so in quite a short period of time. It was required for those children born to foreign parents to make an explicit declaration that they wished to become French citizens at adulthood, so there was not any more automatic proceed to it. But this did not change a lot the state of French citizenship, because once you made this declaration you were granted French citizenship. There was still a right-based vision to it. If you were born in France, if you had lived five years in France between the ages of 11 and 18, and you made this declaration, well, there was no background check, there was no – there was no requirement for any proof of assimilation or integration. But yet it was still a slight tightening up of the law that was repealed by the socialist government in the late 1990s. So today this deferred form of birthright citizenship accounts for around a quarter of all acquisitions of French citizenship.
And then the third main pathway to it is acquisition through marriage to a French citizen. So you can become French when you marry the French citizen after four years of marriage, providing that you still live with your spouse and that you meet a few legal conditions. You have not to have been condemned by – for serial criminal offenses. You have to master an initial level of French language. And so this accounts for around 20 percent of all acquisitions of French citizenship.
So we know how those people became French. One other important question, of course, is, who are these people? Because we know that expanding citizenship has demographic implications, of course, but also political implications because it changes the electorate. When you become a citizen in a democracy, you are entitled to all rights related to citizenship. And of course, voting rights are the first and foremost of them.
We’ve been able to access data that had not been exploited in the French debate so far which comes from Eurostat, which is the statistical office of the European Commission in in Europe, and we know that over the last 20 years nearly 40 percent of all acquisitions of French citizenship concerned nationals from only three countries: Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. So Moroccans were the most numerous. Actually, they accounted alone for around one out of six new French citizens. Then there was Algerians, so in second. France alone granted more than 80 percent of all citizenships awarded to Algerian nationals in the European Union over these two decades. And it also granted more than 60 percent of all European citizenships to Tunisian nationals.
So, of course, this has a lot to deal with the geographical background of immigration to France. More broadly, you have two thirds of those newly acquired French citizenship holders that were born on the African continent, whether in North Africa like the ones we mentioned or in sub-Saharan Africa. There are two main reasons for it. One, of course, is the shape of immigration in France. I just mentioned it. France has by far the most African immigration in the whole of the European Union.
But there is also another factor at stake, which has to deal with institutional incentives. We know that on average around 34 percent of immigrants living in France have acquired French citizenship right now, but this share varies quite considerably according to their region of origin. It’s more than 40 percent of all immigrants from North Africa, for example, but it’s less than 30 percent of all immigrants originating from elsewhere in Europe. And this explanation lies partly with the architecture of what we call EU citizenship, because when you are a citizen of any other EU member state in that you live in another EU member state you already enjoy some extensive rights. You are entitled to legal residence, to establish your business. You can even vote in local elections, in European elections. You can access most of government jobs and public-sector jobs. So the incentive to become a French citizen is quite limited, as opposed, of course, to immigrants arriving from outside of the European Union, for which this acquisition of citizenship has much more extensive implications. So they are more encouraged, more set to ask to apply for French citizenship.
This phenomenon, which is unprecedented in its size and in shape and forms and content, has implications of all kinds. There was a new attempt to reform citizenship law a few years ago in France, but only on a specific territory, which is that of Mayotte. For American viewers, Mayotte is a French territory in the middle of the Indian Ocean. It’s a country that – it’s a territory, sorry, that has been under huge migratory pressure, especially coming from the Comoros, which are the neighboring – the neighboring country. And in response to it, the French parliament introduced specific restrictions on access to French citizenship for children born on this island only. And this new legislation required that at least one parent satisfied prior legal residence conditions for deferred birthright citizenship to be applied when their – when these children turn 18.
And we can see that this has had measurable results on the – on the landscape of birth in Mayotte. Overall, in four years’ period of time between 2021 and 2024, births to foreign mothers in Mayotte declined by around 20 percent. So there was an overall decline of birth in Mayotte, but birth from foreign mothers declined twice as much as births from French citizen mothers in Mayotte, and this can be tied to some extent to the incentive that was set by this new law.
And this is why, through the specific case of Mayotte, this topic of birthright citizenship is now coming back into the public debate in France. We’re working on it, of course, but even beyond ourselves it’s a topic. Many of the candidates for the upcoming French presidential election are starting again to talk about. And it’s even more important that, especially when we talk about elections, we know that this extension of citizenship has implications for elections in France.
You have several ways to look at it, but if you take a look at the most recent opinion polls on this specific point you can see that you have around 40 percent of voters born to two non-European parents that are planning to vote for Jean-Luc Mélenchon, which is the hard-left candidate in France. This is four times as much as the average polling for Jean-Luc Mélenchon. When you take a look at specific migration diasporas, especially those coming from the Muslim world, you have pollings for the hard left that go well beyond 50 percent. So we know that the expansion of citizenship also to some extent changes the rules of the democratic game, and this is something we’ll be trying to shed the light on over the next few weeks.
That’s all for me now. Thank you.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Thank you, Nicolas.
And so now for a look at other countries in Europe, Hungary specifically but also just generally what are the trends in Europe, we’re going to move to Viktor Marsai. And I’ll – we are going to have links to each of these organizations for those of you who would want to follow up. We’ll have that in the show notes. So, Viktor, take it away.
VIKTOR MARSAI: Thank you. Thank you, Mark. And welcome, everybody. I would like to speak a little bit about two big things.
One is that, actually, why we have to speak about citizenship and why it’s a crucial part of the migration crisis in both shores of the Atlantic, both in North America and in Europe, and the lesser extent also in Israel. And how is the Hungarian system looks?
So, first, when we are speaking about the migration crisis or the challenges caused by mass immigration, we tend to focus on numbers – how many migrants are in certain society, whether it’s 10 percent, 15 percent, 20 percent, certain nations. But we have to also underline if we have a look at for – to the Gulf states, for example, Qatar or the United Arab Emirates, you see that 80 or 90 percent of the people who lives there actually are foreigners, but still there’s no – immigration’s not a topic. There’s not a crisis there. And why? Because there is a very strong barrier between citizens and non-citizens. And actually, it’s almost impossible to cross this border line. So this is why it’s very important to speak about how easy to get citizenship in our societies or how complicated to get it.
I just would like to quote some numbers. If you have a look at the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, annually between 200(,000) and 300,000 people gain citizenship there – many of them who arrived, actually, irregularly or perhaps illegally to these countries. If we have a look at other countries, for example in the case of China there is no open statistics, but according different estimations only a couple of hundred, maximum thousands, people gain Chinese citizenship annually. Or, if you have a look at Japan, a country with well over 100 million people, last year only less than 9,000 people gained Japanese citizenship.
And you know, ladies and gentlemen, it’s a key issue because citizenship means, as Nicolas demonstrated, access to the political sphere, to the social welfare system, et cetera, et cetera. So this is why important how easily people in certain countries can gain citizenship. And it’s not accidental that since in Europe it’s relatively easy there are some European countries, for example in Spain, where it seems extremely easy to get citizenship, it’s also a very important pull factor for illegal immigration.
Of course, there is a change now. For example, in Germany, previously at least eight years of residency was necessary to get citizenship. Later, Germany changed to five years, and the previous government changed it to three years, you know? Now the new government with Friedrich Merz, it abolished the three years, so it’s five years. But it means, actually, that next year, 2027, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees who escaped from the war in 2022 will have the possibility to apply German citizenship. So likely in the next year – and German immigration authority and citizenship authorities is preparing for it – we’ll see a new record in the citizenship applications in Germany.
Well, let’s see what’s happening in Hungary in this context. You know, Hungary, it has a little bit similar situation like Israel because there is a huge Hungarian diaspora all around the world. Many are Hungarian people or people with Hungarian ancestor who lives, for example, in North America, according to different estimation, at least 1 ½ million people. And because of the Trianon Treaty after the First World War, there is also huge Hungarian minorities along Hungary. Or, comparing the number of Hungarian citizens within Hungary, it’s 9.6 million; at least 2 million or 2 ½ million Hungarians live around Hungary in Slovakia, Romania, Serbia, and other countries. So, because of these historical reasons, Hungary tried to provide possibility for people with Hungarian ancestor to get Hungarian citizenship.
So the basic rule for anybody who lives in Hungary that she or he has to spend at least eight year(s) in Hungary with a residenceship permit. After, she or he can apply for citizenship. The challenge is actually not the eight year, but the language barrier. Anybody who would like to apply for citizenship could speak in a proper way in Hungarian; that without assistance she or he can participate in a basic exam about the Hungarian history, culture, constitution; and after a(n) oral exam in front of a – of a committee. And you know, I don’t know whether any of you – I know Nicolas tried to do it – (inaudible) – to learn Hungarian; it’s not so easy. And to successfully participate in this and pass this exam, it needs, actually, B2 level Hungarian language knowledge. If any of you check the official webpage of the Hungarian immigration authority, they strictly underline that please concentrate on the language barrier because anybody who’s stating no, no, you don’t have to speak Hungarian to test, it’s lying, and actually many people fail in the test.
So, for every people, eight-year legal residency in Hungary and the Hungarian language pass. And of course, you know, no criminal record, no national security, et cetera, et cetera. And what is also very important, that the applicant has to prove that she or he has the necessary income and background to stay in Hungary without the support of the Hungarian state.
What is related to this diaspora, like I mentioned previously, the Hungarian authorities has two options for so-called simplified naturalization. The first is for people who married with a Hungarian citizen. An average person needs 10 years, 10-year marriage, to apply for citizenship. It can be reduced to five years if the couple has children, OK? In this case, the language barrier is not so strong.
The other simplification, simplified naturalization, is touched by this diaspora community. So anybody who has Hungarian ancestors, and she or he can prove it, can apply for Hungarian citizenship. This new law was accepted in 2010 by at that time the Fidesz government to strengthen the connection with the Hungarian diaspora and the minorities around Hungary. It’s very important that the language test is there as well. So even if somebody can prove that they – she or he had a Hungarian ancestor, if she or he fail the language test the story is over.
To speak about the numbers, in the last 15 years a little bit more than 1 million, 1,100,000 people from the diaspora, which is roughly 5 million Hungarian, managed to get this citizenship. So – and likely, more or less, this is the cap of this process.
Of course, we have to admit that it was one of the tool of the Fidesz as a – as a political instrument to increase its chances in the elections, because these people can vote in the Hungarian elections. But contrary to the assumptions that a big chunk of them will go and vote, in 2022 less than one-quarter of this cohort went to the – (inaudible) – and voted, in general with the overall parliamentary majority for the Fidesz Party. And this year, about one-third of the people voted during the national election. So, altogether, it’s not so big part of the general election procedure. And as you know very well, even it was not enough for the Fidesz Party to win the election.
So what is important? That the Hungarian system at first sight is very generous. If you have Hungarian ancestors, you have, theoretically, easy way to get dual citizenship – the Hungarian one, keeping your other citizenship. But language barrier make it sometimes very, very complicated. Thank you very much.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Thank you, Viktor.
And we have a bunch of questions here. We’ve got a couple of them on a topic that we should have a whole separate panel discussion on, which is dual citizenship or dual nationality. But specifically with regard to children born to migrants, legal or illegal, in the country, is there any issues with regard to dual citizenship that relates to those children getting citizenship? For instance, France in – Nicolas in France, if at some point, like at age 18 or whatever, if they have to decide, do they have to kind of renounce their parents’ citizenship or the one that they had until that point? That sort of thing. So anybody who has any thoughts on that.
MR. POUVREAU-MONTI: Well, in the French case, Mark, there is no such requirement from the French administration at all. Actually, the French administration is not aware of the potential dual citizenship of any of those people who acquire citizenship through deferred birthright law. There are no files which are recording how many of them are keeping their initial citizenship, that of their parents. Most of the time, the issue for acquiring – these people acquiring French citizenship does not come from the French administration, but from some of the countries of origin. We know, for example, that as regards China, China is very hostile to the principle of dual citizenship. So, in theory – I’m not sure the Chinese consulate in France is actually monitoring it very closely – but you cannot become citizen from another country while staying Chinese; you have to renounce your initial citizenship. But when these circumstances happen, they do happen from the country of origin and not from the part of the French administration.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Viktor, did you have some thoughts on that?
MR. MARSAI: Yes. Thank you. I just would like to mention that actually one of the changes in the German system, which was highly criticized by migration-critical groups, was that previously dual citizenship hadn’t been accepted by the German regulation, but they changed it a couple of years ago. So now dual citizenship is possible for people who are applying for citizenship in Germany and they can keep their other citizenship.
And you know, it’s a problem because – and it can be – it could be also a topic of another roundtable, you know? So there – we could observe regular travels from Germany back to the countries of origin, even for persons who are accepted as and recognized as refugees in those countries. So, officially, they are persecuted, I don’t know, in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Somalia, and even they are traveling back there and sometimes using their own passports. And it’s – and why? Because, you know, if they are doing this, they can avoid to be detected at the borders that they left Germany, you know, and went home because, you know, officially in this case they should lose their international protection status.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Like I said, this really should be a whole separate panel discussion on dual citizenship. And maybe we will, in fact, in the fall or next year do one, an INIR panel discussion on dual citizenship.
But one thing – there’s another question that relates, I think, to – potentially to several countries, and that is the role of the courts. As Pawel described, the Supreme Court has ruled on this in the United States, but obviously the issue of the Supreme Court’s authority in Israel has been a hot political topic, and also the European Court of Human Rights has been very involved in these kinds of issues. So my question is, were there – are there issues the courts have dealt with specifically regarding the kids of children born in the country to migrants, foreigners of one kind or another, legal or illegal tourists or whatever? Has that come up in Israel or in European countries or elsewhere in the way that it has in the U.S.?
MR. JAKUBOWICZ: Yeah. So I’ll talk about Israel, of course. The Supreme Court hasn’t ruled any kind of general ruling that grants citizenship rights to migrant children, but it has made it much more difficult to implement policies or to enforce immigration law upon migrants with illegal children, if it’s by forcing the government to do a hearing for the child – if the government wants to deport an illegal migrant, the government has to do a hearing for the child, has to make a social worker’s report. And of course, what happens de facto is that any real attempt to do it is on – by case-by-case is made extremely difficult. In the courts, they put interim verdicts, and de facto the government – the chances of deporting a migrant with the child if that migrant fights it in the courts are very, very slim to nonexistent, even without any kind of official verdict that gives them rights. Until now, we haven’t seen any – the court hasn’t forced the government to grant rights, only makes it difficult to deport migrants even with very small kids. And then, of course, the problem – and then we have that issue of groups that are already de facto in Israel and put political pressure in order to give them. So that’s the courts.
Now we’re starting to see the courts are starting to force the government to give at least temporary residency to illegal migrants, or after a while, not by law or any verdict, just because the minister of interior has discretion and the court feels that it can get into – in Israel, that’s called get into the minister’s shoes and decide what’s right and what’s not right and what’s proportional, what’s not proportional. So on case by case, the courts might force the government to give residency and in very rare cases citizenship – not citizenship; permanent residency that allows upgrading to citizenship.
MR. KRIKORIAN: So, Nicolas or Viktor, is this issue of – I think there’s something in the European Convention on Human Rights about the right to a family life, or maybe that’s something judges made up. Has that had an effect on the – sort of the function that children born to foreigners play? In other words, is it harder to deport somebody as a practical matter? And, Pawel, I want to ask you about that in the U.S. Is it harder to deport somebody – say, you know, an illegal immigrant from Senegal who has a kid in France, is it more difficult as a practical matter, as a legal matter, or both to remove that person?
MR. POUVREAU-MONTI: Well, I can start – I’m sorry – and Viktor will check and correct if necessary.
Well, as you – as you mentioned, Mark, ECHR is very keen on protecting what they call the right to privacy for foreigners, even illegal aliens. But the citizenship factor does not play that big of a role in the – in the case law of ECHR. Actually, citizenship law is one of the very few fields of migration-related policies in Europe in which ECHR law or EU law are not that coercive. You know, there are very various legal regimes for citizenship in Europe. In a country such as Italy, for example, there is no such thing as birthright citizenship at all; it’s seen as part of a legitimate margin for states to appreciate what’s relevant or not for their own national case.
And as far as France is concerned, it’s also one of the few fields in which our own supreme court, which is called the Constitutional Council, has so far not ruled that birthright citizenship was a constitutional right. It was a case that was put out to this court in 1993 when there was – when there was the first attempt to limit birthright citizenship. It was put again in 2018 when there was the specific law regarding Mayotte, this French territory in the Indian Ocean. And so far it was ruled – it has been ruled that this belongs to the – to the realm of the law, the law in parliament. Of course, we are not completely protected from an overturn on any potential upcoming law on this specific field, especially if a law would imply that birthright citizenship would be completely removed. It is, for example, in the platform of Rassemblement National, which is France’s leading restrictionist party today, and there is a risk for them to be – to be confronted with some opposition from the constitutional court. But so far, parliament has kept its hands free on this specific topic.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Interesting.
Any thoughts, Viktor?
MR. MARSAI: Yeah. Well, this topic is more connected to deportation issue, but it’s right; even in the case of Hungary, there are many cases when it was impossible to deport somebody who was proved to be an illegal alien and even according to authorities meant a national security threat for Hungary because of this Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which significantly underlined the possibility of government to act against such kind of illegal migrants because they had kids from, this case, Hungarian women.
What is a little light at the end of the tunnel that it was, I think, one-and-a-half or two months ago when in the Kishinev Declaration the European states declare that this overextension understanding of the Article 8 of the Convention is against the will of the member states, so the courts have to follow a more restrictionist understanding and interpretation. But you know, we have to underline that, OK, it’s in the declaration, but what will happen in the courts? It will see all in the, let’s say, coming years.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Thank you.
Pawel, I’m going to give you the last word because I want to respect people’s time. But, obviously, the courts have played a significant role in this issue in the United States – a decisive role in constitutionalizing, as it were, automatic birthright citizenship for virtually everybody here. But is there – so if there – if a child of an illegal immigrant is born a U.S. citizen, that doesn’t have actual immediate provide legal rights to the parents, as I understand it, of course, but does it in a practical matter mean that they don’t get deported? What’s the situation there?
MR. STYRNA: Yeah. So it’s definitely easier in the U.S. to deport illegal aliens, even if they have kids in the U.S., than it is in Europe. But again, it depends on the judge. We have – there are judges that are, you know, Obama or Biden or even Clinton appointees who are very, very soft on these issues and try to grant as much relief to illegal aliens as they possibly can. Then you have judges who are stricter, who want to actually follow our immigration laws. So it really depends what judge they get and it also depends on the administration. Obviously, under an administration like the Obama one or especially the Biden administration, there’s a lot of leeway for illegal aliens. When you get an administration like the Trump administration, you have a push to remove illegal aliens, even if they have U.S.-born children. And they have a choice. They can either, you know, leave the kids with a – you know, with a relative who’s legal, or they can take the kids with them. But in practice, a lot of – so, you know, I’ve spoken to illegal aliens over the years about these – about these things, and you know, a lot of them do admit that, well, yeah, you know, it’s easier to avoid deportation having these U.S.-born kids here, and plus I’m hoping that once the kids turn 21 that they can – they can sponsor me for a green card.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Right.
MR. STYRNA: Now, in practice, it’s hard to get a green card that there is a special, you know – again, I’m not a lawyer, but there is a special petition that they have to file, and it’s not granted very easily. But just because it’s not granted easily doesn’t mean that a lot of illegal aliens don’t have that hope.
In general, you know, U.S. children of illegal – U.S.-born children of illegal aliens were called, quote/unquote, “anchor babies” for a long time not because – that’s not a pejorative term. It just – it comes from the world of boating and like an anchor. You know, illegal aliens are hoping that having a child here would anchor them in the United States and make them a lot harder to deport. And in practice, you know, that that’s often true – not as often as in Europe, but it still – it still works to their benefit in many cases because they can, you know, maybe get a deferral – I’m sorry, a – you know, they can get their removal canceled if they can show that there is a particular hardship to a – to their U.S. citizen child, and so forth.
But again, I think the main thing to remember is the reason why the open borders side loves – just loves automatic birthright citizenship is because of this anchoring effect, you know. Any time they can show a crying child, you know, they try to, you know – (laughs) – squeeze as much out of that as they can to hinder immigration enforcement, to hinder repatriation.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Right. Well, thank you, Pawel. Thank you, Viktor and Yonatan and Nicolas, for this interesting discussion. There’s actually all kinds of more angles of this issue I’d love to talk about. So we’ll almost certainly have future panel discussions like this sponsored by INIR, the International Network for Immigration Research that all of our organizations belong to.
If you came in – tuned in late to this, the whole panel discussion will be – the recording of it will be on our site at CIS.org, as well as links to the various organizations that you all represent, so that people can follow up if they want to. Thank you very much. And until next time, we will convene for now. Thanks a lot.
MR. STYRNA: Thank you.
MR. POUVREAU-MONTI: Thank you.
MR. STYRNA: Thank you. It was a pleasure. Thank you.