Media
Event Summary
At a moment when calls for large-scale deportations are reshaping politics on both sides of the Atlantic, an International Network for Immigration Research (INIR) panel asks a difficult question: Can democracies actually deport large numbers of people, and what happens if they try?
Despite years of political focus, large-scale deportation remains extraordinarily difficult to execute in democratic systems governed by courts, rights protections, and bureaucratic limits. This timely panel explored what is politically popular, what is legally possible, and what is practically achievable.
Date and Location
April 9, 2026
Washington, DC
MARK KRIKORIAN: Hello. My name is Mark Krikorian. I’m executive director of the Center for Immigration Studies.
And during the 2024 presidential campaign Donald Trump promised, quote, “the largest deportation operation in the history of our country,” unquote. Since returning to the White House, the administration has deported close to half a million people, though the reported statistics are incomplete. And this is a huge increase, of course, in interior removals – in other words, deportations from inside the country, not the border – over prior administrations, but there are still 14, 15 million illegal immigrants in the United States. And the events in Minneapolis show that there is resistance to actually removing illegal immigrants.
On the other side of the ocean, just last month the German government said that as a result of negotiations with the new regime in Syria that it expected 80 percent of Syrians in Germany to go home or be removed over a period of three years. But the Syrian government quickly denounced that and said that’s not at all what they had in mind. And more generally, there are some EU countries where no more than 10 percent of people ordered deported actually go home.
So this seemed like a good time to ask the question, can democracies actually deport large numbers of people? This is an existential issue, potentially, for countries on both sides of the Atlantic. And that’s why the Center for Immigration Studies is hosting this event for the International Network for Immigration Research, or INIR, which is a collaboration among research organizations in a variety of countries that have very different legal immigration policies but all agree on the importance of law enforcement and national sovereignty.
Our speakers today are representatives of four of the member groups of INIR. Our first speaker will be Jim Robb, vice president of alliances at NumbersUSA. He’s immersed himself for years in public opinion research on the immigration issue, and he’s going to talk about what the polling tells us about public opinion on this question of removing illegal immigrants and sending them home.
Next is Matt O’Brien, who is deputy executive director of the Federation for Immigration Reform. Has many years of experience working in immigration agencies, including as an immigration judge. And he’s going to talk about some of the legal obstacles that are involved in deportation.
Viktor Marsai is executive director of the Migration Research Institute in Budapest and an expert on migration trends in Africa and the security aspects of the migration issue. And he’s going to talk about the difficulties that European countries face in removing people who have no right to live in their borders.
Finally, I have some thoughts on my own on this issue, after which we will take questions. If you’re watching this live, send your questions to [email protected] – that’s [email protected] – and we’ll take as many of them as we have time for.
So, without any further ado, Jim?
JIM ROBB: Thank you, Mark. And hello, everyone.
The ability to deport people from a Western or, I should say, a democratic country, it’s – first and foremost it depends on the public appetite to do so. So in a democracy you can – you can go against your public for a certain amount of time or to a certain degree, but if the public gets too negative then the government in power will want to adjust – will have to adjust. So we’ve got a good case study in the United States – and I will go through some of that – that shows the pros and cons of, and especially as how it’s been attempted in the United States in the second Trump administration.
First, let’s look at slide one. And this is from the Harvard-Harris Poll, March edition. So this is, like, a two-week-old poll that was published. I like the Harvard-Harris Poll because it’s neither left nor right and Mark Penn, who runs that poll, is kind of an old-fashioned Clinton Democrat who likes to get to the subtleties of public opinion and is fairly reliable, I think.
So this is from his latest poll in March, as I said, and it’s about Trump approval on various subjects. And you notice – this is the good news for those of us who want to reduce the presence of illegal immigrants in America – immigration is really his – it’s tied for his second – well, it’s his second most popular issue after a first place two-way tie. So his most popular issues, as you can see by looking at this right column – the right column represents March – this is where it is now – and it shows you the monthly readings on it. But popular is his fighting crime in American cities and his returning America to its values. But these can be a little vague. Immigration is – because of the events in the headlines is – people have actual events to connect with that. But notice even though it’s dropped – his popularity has dropped from its height of his first month of being in charge in February ’25 – it was 56 percent, it’s down to 46 (percent); he’s lost 10 points – but he’s lost less than some of his other positions have lost. This is still a strength for Trump, so something to build on. That’s after everything that’s happened in Minneapolis and to this hour.
Slide two, please. Now let’s – what about his immigration policy? How do people feel about some of his particular policies? And I highlight three with the orange highlighter, from the most popular at the top to the least popular at the bottom, of administration positions.
So deporting immigrants who are here illegally and have committed crimes has almost – has near universal support from both parties. So 77 percent of the American public support deporting immigrants who are here illegally and have committed crimes. Amongst Democrats 70 percent support that; 87 percent of Republicans; and, very important, 74 percent of independents.
Now, going to the next, deporting all immigrants who are here illegally. Well, 54 percent, even after everything that’s happened, are still with that. In fact, that percentage did not go down meaningfully even after Minneapolis. So look – but Democrats, it’s only a minority who support deporting all illegals, but still 32 percent – I think that’s – it’s almost unbelievable considering how their leaders in Congress talk – 80 percent of Republicans; and a good half of independents. Still not hurting there.
OK. Now we get to it, down at the bottom one: Hiring an additional 20,000 Border Patrol and ICE agents to conduct immigration raids and policing. So 45 percent of the public backs that. Doesn’t sound too terrible to you. Look at over on the right on who’s believing what. So the Democrats, only 22 percent want to hire additional ICE and Border Patrol agents to do what they were doing in Minneapolis, various other cities, and across the country. So ICE is a sticking point, probably less so the Border Patrol. But the real problem is only 36 percent of independents are – want to give any more resources.
Next slide. Slide three, please. Let’s talk about the popularity or lack thereof of various American institutions. The U.S. military is the most popular institution in America, with a total of 74 percent either completely supportive or somewhat supportive, and unfavorable is only 13 percent – 61 percent above water, as we say in polling circles. So, wow, that’s very popular. Now, note, that’s even though the present war in Iran is only semi-popular or halfway popular, or even less than that in the most recent polls. So they are able to separate the institution fighting the war from the war.
All right. That’s important when we look at the thing I’ve highlighted, which is Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE – the famous ICE – now down to only 37 percent net supportive against 49 percent non-supportive. Obviously, there are some who haven’t made up their mind. It’s 11 percentage points, therefore, underwater. So in the case of ICE, the public is not able to separate the institution from some of the actions which irritated the public, and that’s a warning sign.
Slide four, more on ICE. When it comes to Immigration and Customs Enforcement, would you prefer to keep the – keep funding ICE without making any changes on how it operates or not provide any more funding to ICE unless it makes changes on how it operates? So 60 percent of the public wants changes. That’s why we still have a Homeland Security funding crisis, because people are reading these polls. And then, amongst the parties, the Democrats are 81 percent in this red circle, which is no more money unless there’s changes in how ICE operates. And although Republicans feel the exact opposite, the real problem here is the independents, which 72 percent say no funding unless there are changes.
So I think all of this is shorthand for the public is iffy on deportations. And the problem is, we’ve deported half a million and got, like, 14 million to go – (laughs) – so this is going to have to be reversed because ICE does the deportations.
We’ll go to the next slide, which is slide five. We’ll see this is the – this is net Trump approval right now, and it’s – and then I’ve just highlighted two ethnic groups to show you another problem for Republicans right now. Forty-nine percent of Whites support Trump – approve of Trump, rather, right now – and 48 percent against, so he’s still net positive amongst the White population. But Hispanics, who were – had broken 50/50 for him a year ago, are now down to 29 percent support and 63 (percent). I think that’s – it’s partly about immigration enforcement and it’s partially about inflation and affordability issues. But this is the danger and why we may see – there have been some changes and there may be some more changes just based on this, because who wants to lose an election? Because without the Hispanics being a lot higher than this, even with lower participation numbers the House is gone and the Senate is threatened.
All right. So, stealing a little bit of Mark’s thunder, probably – (laughter) – was there – is there another way to do it? I think what the polling is telling us – and I’m examining much more polling than this, but I think what it’s saying to us overall is Americans do support deportations even of every illegal if it’s done quietly in a way that doesn’t rub their faces in it. Americans don’t like something that looks like chaos. They don’t like something that looks like disorder or something that looks brutal, even if it’s not. They don’t like – in the 21st century, appearances are a big thing.
I don’t have time to go into possibilities, et cetera, but I say that – I’ll say this. I think some of the personnel changes that the administration’s made in the last month will probably be helpful on this because a little bit more careful and prudent group, law and order, do it by the book is going to have a positive effect over time. I think it already is.
But the big bet that the administration has missed has been not emphasizing the need for E-Verify and employer sanctions, employer perp walks, and – on the – on the employment side, because when you – when you make jobs harder to get by things like E-Verify, which is – E-Verify is a(n) electronic system the government’s run for about 25 years which checks for the authenticity of a Social Security card that’s presented to them, and it’s remarkably effective where it’s mandatory. So only about half of American new hires are currently checked with E-Verify, and most of those are bigger companies, and they don’t have any illegals working there as a result. If we would make it mandatory for every U.S. employer, what we would have on net is that many fewer – many fewer illegals would come because the word would get down, oh, you can’t get a job anymore. And people would start self-deporting.
I’m already over time, I’m told. I would just note that on this bar this shows that E-Verify, the policy, is overwhelmingly favored by every conceivable group, including Democrats and independents. It’s heavily favored. So this is something to add to the mix. That’s all. Thanks.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Thank you, Jim. Matt?
MATT O’BRIEN: So, Mark, you said let’s talk about some of the legal obstacles to deportation. Well, the fact is there really aren’t many. We have had a problem in this country for decades where both Republican and Democrat administrations have a tendency to ignore whatever portions of the immigration law they do not like in order to pander to perceived political constituencies. That’s a major problem, because in a republic like we have Congress is responsible for changing the laws and the executive shouldn’t be rejiggering the law because they don’t like what it requires them to do.
And you know, for anybody that doubts that, way back in 1892 in a case called Ekiu v. United States the Supreme Court said that when it comes to the admission and removal of foreign nationals due process is whatever Congress says it is. And they also reinforce a point that as a fundamental attribute of sovereignty any sovereign nation can determine who can enter its dominions, how long they can stay, and under what conditions. So I think a lot of the pushback that is – you know, that has been seen against the removal of the people the Trump administration is currently going after – the vast majority of whom already received due process and have a final order of removal that just has never been executed; or are people who, you know, were subject to a final order of removal and how have a felony conviction – the pushback is coming from the fact that a lot of the public doesn’t understand how this is supposed to work.
And you know, much of that is evident in this constant refrain about judicial warrants for the arrest of people who are subject to civil removal. Well, the fact is that federal judges can issue orders to enforce the dictates of the courts and to require people to comply with court orders, and they do that largely on the basis of powers assigned to them by statute. They don’t have any authority whatsoever to issue an arrest warrant for a person who is subject to civil removal from the United States because Congress put the responsibility for civil removal in the immigration court, not in the federal courts that are part of the judicial branch. And Congress also set up a situation where administrative warrants are the vehicle, and the reason that this is done is because in most cases Congress’ interest in protecting the public grossly outweighs any constitutional interest that an alien has in being here because there is no legal claim to enter the United States if you’re a foreign national outside and there’s very few constitutionally protected legal claims to remain in the United States if you are a foreign national. So you have a right to due process before any permission that you’ve been granted to remain here is taken away, but that’s about the extent of it.
So, you know, for some strange reason we have entered this situation where, as Thomas Sowell, the economist, put it, when it comes to immigration law we’re always talking about how is it appropriate for people to violate the immigration laws and evade the consequences of violating them, where every other area of law what we focus on is how to keep people from violating the consequences of those laws. And if you stop and think about this, certain types of relief from removal we consider equities – or, I should say we consider as equities when we are granting relief from removal the fruits of the crime. So if I want to apply for withholding of removal, I have to prove that I have evaded law enforcement and successfully repeatedly violated the immigration laws for seven to 10 years, depending upon which section of law I fall under. And then I talk about as equities all of the things that I only could have acquired after having become a trespasser in the United States, which is property ownership, family ties, bank accounts, things of that nature.
Now, if you put that in a different context and look at that, if I steal the Mona Lisa, I hang it over my fireplace, and I leave it there for 30 years, and finally the gendarmes catch up with me, if I go into a French court and say this is profoundly unjust, this should not be taken away from me because I have grown very attached to La Joconde, and I like to sit there and drink my XO cognac in front of the fireplace every night and look at her, and if this is taken away from me this will be an absolute terrible travesty, I’m going to be laughed out of court. But yet, that is exactly the type of legal analysis that we engage in in immigration court when we are looking at these things. So that’s a huge problem.
Then we have a problem where many of the decisions that are made in immigration are protected by statute, and the Immigration and Nationality Act very specifically says that the federal district courts do not have any jurisdiction to rule on them, and yet what we’ve seen both in the first Trump administration and over the course of the second Trump administration is federal district courts ignoring those provisions in the statutes that say, hey, you don’t have any jurisdiction over this. And this is a problem because when judges are confronted with legal issues there is a tendency to want to examine the issue and exert the court’s power, so it’s very rare for courts to say, no, we don’t have jurisdiction over this. Frankly, I don’t understand that because when I was a judge – (laughs) – I was so overloaded that any time I had an opportunity to say this is someone else’s problem, I get lunch and a bathroom break today, I seized that opportunity. But it’s – you know, for some reason when it comes to the judicial branch courts they don’t want or relinquish jurisdiction over anything, even when Congress has explicitly told them that they lack any jurisdiction whatsoever.
And so we have seen a situation where the federal district courts keep issuing injunctions and rulings on these immigration matters, and they are soundly declared a victory by the people who are in favor of open borders and not enforcing the immigration laws, and then, you know, several months/years down the road these make it into the higher appellate courts or to the Supreme Court and they wind up being overturned, and the Trump administration wins on these things or the people of the United States win on these things, depending upon how you want to look at it. And everything that groups like FAIR and Numbers and Center for Immigration Studies have been saying about immigration enforcement and what is required under law is proven to be true repeatedly, and yet for some reason there is a certain aspect of the public that just does not want to accept that as truth.
So that’s sort of in a nutshell the legal situation. But the – you know, the fact of the matter when you get down to brass tacks is that the Trump administration has won on this more often than not. And if we want to enforce the immigration laws in a meaningful way, then we have to enforce them as they were written by Congress and not let the executive branch pick and choose what aspects of it it likes or does not like. Otherwise, what’s the purpose to having those laws? Congress should change them if they’re not satisfied with the way they currently are.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Thank you, Matt. Viktor?
VIKTOR MARSAI: Thank you, Mark. So let’s jump to the other shore of the Atlantic, to Europe, and have a picture of what’s going on there.
Definitely deportation is the Achilles’ heel of EU immigration and asylum system. Mark quoted some numbers. Currently, the successful deportation rate in the EU is below 20 percent, which mean that there’s no any deterrency in the system. So anybody who managed to get into territory of the European Union, any member state, it’s high likelihood that he will or she stay forever there.
Even we don’t have exact numbers how many illegal aliens are in the territory of the European Union, estimations – lower estimations are around three hundred (sic; million) but higher estimations somewhere six (million), seven (million), or perhaps eight hundred – sorry, million. Just an example, perhaps you have heard about this legalization of half a million so-called undocumented – so actually, illegal – migrants in Spain. But according new statistics, perhaps not just 500,000 but 800,000 or perhaps 1 million illegal alien are just in Spain. So we don’t have the correct numbers.
In this general context, I would like to highlight three big topics. One is political will, partially mentioned by Jim. The second is legal framework. And the third is the cooperation with the countries of origin or other third countries.
First, it’s very clear that there’s no real political will in the EU for member states to pursue a much stricter deportation policy because very obvious reason: Politicians and the public, as Jim mentioned, don’t like ugly pictures, don’t like watching crying babies. And besides this, it’s very clear that the ethos of good people who are preventing deportations – including NGOs, judges, or Lufthansa pilots who reject to fly with deportation back to other countries – they enjoy high popularity all around Europe. And as you experienced in Minnesota and in other parts of the U.S., it’s the same in Europe. So politicians didn’t – don’t want to touch this issue. They would like to conduct secret and silence deportation, which is not possible if you have to deport – if you want to deport millions of people. Even we can see, for example, in Germany that they introduced new categories contrary to their other – their own law to tell something about approximately 300,000 people who are rejected asylum seekers, but even they don’t want to depart, this “dudlung” category, because Germans realized that they try to deport 30,000 people and let 270,000 people in “dudlung” category. Simply, they don’t want to enforce a more stricter deportation policy.
The second is legal framework, both in national and international level. So national level, it’s very hard to pursue strict deportation policies because in many cases the police and the immigration office lack the authority, for example, to enter into certain flats. Some of my German contact in Bonn for the German immigration office complain that, OK, they went to a certain flat with the authorization to enter, but just two minutes ago the deportee people went to the neighboring flat and stayed there, and they don’t have, you know, the right to enter the property. Which means that, for example, if a deportation flight would fly, let’s say, 200 people but they manage to collect only 51, it means that the per-person deportation cost would be – would be four times more, so they completely cancel the whole deportation because they don’t want to explain in the parliament why they deported four times higher cost anyone. So we see how the system sometimes is broken in the national level.
But we see it also in EU level. You know, the whole asylum policy of the member states are determined by EU legal framework. And until now it was a highly flexible one, mainly in the context of third countries and safe third countries. If we have a look at the map which is demonstrated soon, you see that there’s no direct armed conflict in the close neighborhood of Europe. The only exception is Ukraine, which is a different category with this temporary protection regime which is implemented by the EU. So most people arriving to Europe crossing a lot of safe third countries. But until recently, the regulation hold that asylum seekers had to have a real connection to the third country where he transited. What real connection meant? Family connections there; previous presence there – so actually, he lived and worked there; or close cultural and linguistic relationship. So it meant that directly there was no real safe third countries around Europe because most Afghans, for example, or Syrians never lived in Turkey before or in the Western Balkan(s). So, officially, EU member states had to admit these people.
Now – and it’s a positive phenomenon – there’s two new regulation which was accepted by the European Parliament and will soon by the Council of Europe as well that about the safe countries of origin, which means that each EU candidate member states is considered as a safe third country of origin and also seven other countries – for example, Morocco or Tunisia are on the list. Which means that asylum procedure in these cases will be an expedited process, so much shorter and likely an easier way to – (audio break) – step is the new regulation about safe third countries, which terminated this real connection category. So now it’s enough if the people transit these countries or there are agreement between these countries and the EU that they are ready to accept back asylum seekers, because in this context the asylum application in EU territory, if their people cross these safe third countries, is inadmissible. So everybody is expecting that it will provide some relief in the system, but it’s very important that it’s not the outsourcing or asylum procedures so it’s not possible to make a Remain in Mongolia program or Remain in Tunisia. We are always joking about this – (laughter) – because it’s only the case of rejected asylum seekers or people who cross these territories, so it’s actually just the end of the whole procedure.
And the third issue – and perhaps this is the weakest point of this whole EU deportation regime – is the cooperation with the third countries – (inaudible) – countries of origin or transit countries, because even if the legal framework is changing by these two new EU regulation it’s hard to tell why the countries of origin or transit countries would be ready to cooperate with the European Union. It’s clearly only a stick and carrot politics which could work, because if there’s no pressure these countries are not interested to take back their citizen or other third-country citizens. And even if we know that EU is one of the biggest donor of these countries in term of humanitarian and development assistance, until the recent months countries were reluctant and the EU were reluctant to utilize this to make pressure, to use the stick on these countries.
There are some positive developments. Some EU member states send an open letter to the Commission and the European External Action Service to start a diplomatic campaign to press these countries around Europe to accept back their citizens and rejected third-country asylum seekers. We’ll see the result. But again, the thinking in the European public and still EU institutions to make more pressure on these countries to cooperate is still low.
And, yeah, my concluding remark is that, yes, really, the EU politicians don’t want to see ugly pictures, even if mass deportation, if we look around for some international examples, would be possible. Just one number from Saudi Arabia, which if of course not a democracy, but launched a successful deportation campaign. Between 2017 and 2022, Saudi Arabia sent back more than 2 million illegal alien from the country. And Saudi Arabia is an important example because most people – most illegal alien from Saudi Arabia was put on the plane. Now, for example, in the case of Germany, the big official argumentation is it’s not possible to bring back the Syrians to Syria because it would need, I don’t know, four, five, six planes each day to bring back so many people. But the example of Saudi Arabia demonstrates that technically it’s possible. So thank you very much.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Thank you, Viktor.
Before we go to questions, I just wanted to kind of, I think, reframe the issue a little bit because there are two different illegal alien populations, in a sense. They’re not rigidly divided, but there is a broad difference. One is those who are public safety threats, and by that I don’t mean people involved in crime. When, Jim, you were talking about the responses – public opinion responses when people ask about criminals, they don’t mean criminals; they mean public safety threats, because all illegal aliens – almost all of them are criminals. And I don’t just mean that they cross the border illegally, as most did, which is a misdemeanor on the first offense, a felony on the second; but identity theft, tax fraud, perjury, failure to depart after you’re ordered to depart. These are all felonies. So almost every adult illegal alien is by definition a criminal. The subset that ICE mostly deals with is those who are public safety threats – violent criminals, drug dealers, drunk drivers, that sort of thing – as well as people who have been – who have final orders of removal and haven’t left, which, again, that makes them felons. The bulk of illegal immigrants, though, are just ordinary working stiffs. Again, they’ve violated all these laws, but they’re not immediate public safety threats, the guy washing dishes in a restaurant or what have you. And those two populations require different approaches, in my opinion.
ICE, in what I call body armor enforcement – in other words, where ICE actually goes and grabs up people – is mostly going to be directed at public safety threats. And those are people who are – you know, they’re a smaller portion of the illegal population, so it’s actually practical to focus resources on grabbing them up one at a time. But as Pappy O’Daniel in the movie “O Brother, Where Art Thou?” said in kind of a different context – I’m going to borrow and change his quote – he was asked by his idiot son whether he should go and press the flesh with some people walking out of a radio station as he was walking in to make a radio address. He said, “We ain’t one at a time in here. We are mass communicating.” Well, ICE can one at a time grab up people, but it can’t do that for 14 million people. It’s just not – I mean, it doesn’t matter how many ICE agents there are. Which means the bulk of illegal immigrants have to be persuaded to leave.
And the way you do that, as Jim suggested, is: Make them unemployable; make them un-bankable; make them un-licensable – un-IDable, as it were; and get people to leave. It’s ICE deportation versus self-deportation. And the key to getting most illegal immigrants to leave is not to stop enforcing the law. ICE has to keep doing its hands-on body armor enforcement, but you also need briefcase enforcement, as I put it – in other words, audits, employment-related enforcement, Social Security no-match letters to employers whose payroll information that they submitted doesn’t match the government’s information, and following up on this – on all of this information – IRS enforcement related to immigration. These kinds of things are the only practical way you’re going to be able to address that larger portion of the illegal population and get them to leave, because as everyone acknowledges even any large effort to remove illegal immigrants – again, at least in a democracy; in Saudi Arabia they can do whatever they want, but that’s a whole different story for us – (laughter) – the most people – most illegal immigrants who are going to leave are going to leave on their own because the regular enforcement and the briefcase enforcement, as it were, has sent the message that the party is over.
And that’s where I think this administration and the Europeans, likewise, have to rethink their approach. Because we have different approaches. In Europe you can’t work, but you can get on welfare. Here, if you’re an illegal it’s hard to get on welfare – it still happens – but you can work, even if it’s illegally. And so the point is both of those have to not be able to happen. And it’s not going to solve everything, but it is essential. And this administration has so far been lacking in employment-related enforcement, whether it’s actually raiding worksites and having perp walks of American employers, which is essential politically as well as in a policy sense. But also the paperwork-related enforcement aggressively enforced, aggressively pursued can have a significant effect.
So, with that, I’m going to take some questions. We have a few in here already. Viktor, I want to maybe start with you. What is – there is this idea of these return hubs that the EU is pursuing. What does that – what does that mean?
MR. MARSAI: Yeah. So the big question is, even if there is cooperation, the third country which would be ready to take back inadmissible asylum seekers or rejected asylum seekers, the question is, where? Just put them in the middle of an airport, or how to manage it? And in this new EU regulation, the concept is that the EU will help the countries, of course providing money and perhaps stuff, to establish return hub, return center. So, like processing centers, but there is no any processing there; just people are there and waiting whether they can go back, finally, to countries of origin, or a certain point they will try to integrate into those societies. But it will be the entry point of these inadmissible aliens or rejected asylum seekers.
The big question is always in the details. Officially, there is two year possible detention maximum. So the real question, what happening these people after 24 months? If it’s a successful issue, they integrate into the society, they will be happy in Mongolia – not Remain, but Go to Mongolia Program, OK? But if not, it’s still the responsibility of the member state who processed the asylum application to take them back. So the big question will be, it’s just the prolongation of the problem and after two years the guy is coming back to the EU member state, or they will find another, durable solution?
MR. KRIKORIAN: Interesting.
Matt, I had a question for you. This is my question, but we also have a question from a listener. The way he puts it: At some point, should the Trump administration respond to these meddling federal district judges by pointing out the clear language of the statute, et cetera? And so that leads to kind of my general framing of this, is: What do you do about this? I mean, Congress has said district court judges – district courts don’t have jurisdiction, and yet they just exercise jurisdiction. And so what’s the solution to that?
MR. O’BRIEN: That’s a difficult question because, you know, attorneys, we’re all obligated, you know, as officers of the court to obey the laws of the republic and to accept the orders issued by the court as valid even if they’re not, because the procedure for overturning the invalid decisions is to take them to the next higher court.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Right.
MR. O’BRIEN: And so that creates a situation where, the way the appellate system works, if there’s an appeal of right to the next level, then you can get the case heard; but if the appellate court doesn’t rule the correct way and perpetuates the injustice, you have a problem. And of course, the Supreme Court does cases on what’s called a writ of certiorari, meaning they can pick whatever they feel is appropriate to be decided. But they’re not going to –
MR. KRIKORIAN: There’s only so many hours in the day and there’s only nine of them.
MR. O’BRIEN: Right.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Right.
MR. O’BRIEN: And they’re not obligated to take the vast majority of cases that come before them. So that’s sort of the legal answer.
I mean, I think the practical answer is there’s the Andrew Jackson gambit, where Andrew Jackson when he was president had a decision that he received it and didn’t like and he said, OK, I’m going to consider this as applicable to the facts of this particular case and no other.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Oh, I see.
MR. O’BRIEN: And when – if he got another unfavorable decision that was broader, his quote was something to the effect of, OK, well, the Supreme Court made the decision; let’s see them enforce it. And you know, that’s a difficult one as somebody who’s a lawyer and has been a judge. You know, I don’t like the thought of people outright revolting against the courts. But at a certain point it becomes the responsibility of the executive and the legislative branch when the courts are not behaving to bring them to heel through the governmental processes that are in place to do that, and I think that the Trump administration has been taking measures in that direction.
But I guess the broader – you know, broader implications of that question go back to what I said in the beginning: What is it about immigration law that we feel as a society that it’s just perfectly to ignore any portions of it that we don’t like, you know, whether that’s a presidency or whether it’s the judiciary? I mean, the fact is that we live in a rule-of-law-based republic, and once Congress makes the laws the courts are supposed to interpret them and the executive is supposed to apply them, and nobody’s supposed to be intruding onto anybody else’s territory. And what we have now is we have Congress refusing to legislate, we have the courts acting like a low-rent legislature or super-legislature, and the executive branch acting like, you know, a low-rent judiciary and legislature, because nobody’s doing the jobs they’re supposed to be doing.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Right.
MR. ROBB: Could I make a comment on that?
MR. KRIKORIAN: Yeah, please.
MR. ROBB: Yeah. And I think – I think it’s part of the general phenomenon of American politics resembling more and more that of politics of Europe. And it’s like – it’s like the political actors in this country have sort of gotten the idea that we’re a parliamentary democracy.
MR. O’BRIEN: Yes.
MR. ROBB: Right? And so it’s – when you’re – (laughs) – when you – when you sort of lose your focus on the Constitution and the – and the balance that’s supposed to be there –
MR. O’BRIEN: Well said.
MR. ROBB: – little good can come, right? Because we’re trying to run somebody else’s system, but we’re not that system, right? And it’s not working all that well in Europe either to be responsive to the facts on the ground and the situation, so.
MR. KRIKORIAN: And actually, I kind of wanted to take that to Viktor. Clearly, this issue of immigration in general is driving real political change in Europe. These immigration-skeptic parties, whatever their various faults or shortcomings, are surging in popularity. But, at the same time, there is a similar divide in the public – in other words, there’s real polarization – because as, you know, the National Rally in France or AfD or whatever these parties do well, there’s always a – there’s, you know, a hardcore on the left or even the ostensible right, but it’s really the center-left, which doesn’t want this. And so it seems to me this issue of deportation really strikes at the core of whether, you know, democratic societies, democratic governance can even really function. So, I mean, what are you seeing in Europe with regard to these anti-immigration parties?
MR. MARSAI: Yes, of course, and I think we had a panel last year about the effects of immigration politics and policies on the right of restrictionist parties in Europe. But still until now, my – yeah, we see the rise of a more restrictionist position even in the mainstream parties, but most examples demonstrate that there is only small technical issues. So reducing the number, I don’t know, 1,000. OK, Germans are very happy that they managed to deport back all together, let’s say, 100 serious Afghan criminals.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Right.
MR. MARSAI: I mean, it’s a huge success story. OK, but there are thousands or almost 10,000 serious Afghan criminals in the – in Germany.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Not even mentioning just regular illegal aliens, too.
MR. MARSAI: Yeah. And these are the criminals, yeah. So I don’t see, really, a turning point.
And it was also clear in the – in the case of the current German government, which communicated a very harsh immigration policy but after when they won the election only small, small issues happened. And even – you know, I mentioned the Spanish example – there are strong open-border advocates in the mainstream politics of Europe. And the problem in Europe is that it’s not the time to make small things to fix; no, it needs a completely different approach because the problem is very high.
And what you mentioned, Mark, previously, it’s a fundamental – there are two fundamental differences, I think, in the – on this whole migration crisis between the U.S. and Europe. In the U.S., most illegal immigrants arriving to work. If they’re crossing the southwest border successfully and don’t catch by Border Patrol, perhaps they at work within a week. In Europe, it’s a humanitarian issue. They go immediately to the asylum system – huge burden, long asylum procedure, no possibility to go to work. So it’s a –
MR. KRIKORIAN: And they’re on – they’re being supported by the state, too, by the taxpayers.
MR. MARSAI: Absolutely. Yeah, completely.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Yeah.
MR. MARSAI: And shelter, food, health care. And you know, which also, you know, an obstacle for integration because you are waiting in the center, getting the money, likely you can go to work, and it extend perhaps for years.
And the other big difference is that still most people – and I know during the Biden administration geographically there was a big divide, so not only from the Northern Triangle and Mexico and Latin America but still – (inaudible) – majority of the people arriving coming from Christian countries, some cultural –
MR. KRIKORIAN: Similarities.
MR. MARSAI: – similarity to what’s going on in – or, what’s in the – in the United States, and also host communities which can help some – in some level of integration. But in the last 10 or, let’s say, 13 years, many community arrived to Europe without any cultural background, not any knowledge, and with very different mindset. And it doesn’t mean that these people are bad people or bad intention, just let’s think on an Afghan, you know, is coming a country where they’re – actually, there’s no statehood for 50 years, not any knowledge what loyalty towards a central government means because it’s still a tribal society with tribal loyalty. How to explain him that, no, no, now you have to be loyal to the Swedish state? What is the Swedish state? He’s not my relative, you know. (Laughter.) So this is what’s a big difference.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Yeah. Interesting.
Jim, we have a question here for you which somebody writes in: Why is there so much legal and public pushback if this was a major issue in the last major – presidential election? And my sense is – I mean, before you’ll say your peace; maybe I’ll take your answer – but some of this pushback I think is an attempt to undo the election, in a sense, by people who didn’t vote for these kind of policies. But anyway, what are your thoughts on this?
MR. ROBB: Well, sure. We now have a situation where we have reflexive Democratic opposition – Democratic Party opposition to anything led by Republicans, OK? So that explains Democrats have really low support for deportation policies or really any kind of restriction at all. But it doesn’t explain the independents dropping like a stone with their support of these. That’s a different phenomenon. There’s no organization amongst the independents. So it shows that it’s actually a more popular phenomenon.
And I think we have this old phrase in – that’s very, very old in America: If it bleeds, it leads. So that means if it’s colorful, if it’s – if it’s – if you can shoot it with a video camera and it’s good TV, then that’s the thing that’s going to be the lead story, right? And so the problem is we have this weird thing where Americans really do narrowly support removing all illegal immigrants, but with a couple of caveats. It has to be done quietly, apparently, because ICE is like – in a big country with three hundred and what, forty-two million people?
MR. KRIKORIAN: Something like that.
MR. ROBB: So we had a couple of deaths, now a couple more for people resisting arrest, basically, or trying to protect someone that ICE is going after. And this is, like, issue number one because people just have a low tolerance for – when it gets into the news and they have to see it themselves.
MR. KRIKORIAN: As Art Arthur wrote, people want the laws enforced; they just don’t want to see them being enforced, at least with regard to immigration.
MR. ROBB: Right, but we can’t – but some of this thing between the parties, this is American, right, but we see the same reluctance in Europe, right?
MR. KRIKORIAN: Sure, sure. Of course.
MR. ROBB: So it’s – in democratic countries, well, I mean, we’ve had – to speak just a little more broadly, we’ve had – we’ve enshrined sentimentality as the main driver of all policy in the West, right? So it’s like – it’s like, baby seals get a lot of attention, right? (Laughter.) Because when you beat them to get the fur, it’s a horrible thing to see, and so there’s lots of attention.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Right.
MR. ROBB: And, yeah, so since our policies are driven by sentimentality and objective reality is given only short shrift in terms of the way it bears, there’s all kinds of sensible policies that are not pursued because it doesn’t look good or doesn’t feel good. So –
MR. KRIKORIAN: I had a graduate school advisor who in a foreign policy context said the American people support all steps short of action. (Laughter.) And I think that relates to the whole deportation question, both in Europe and here.
So, Matt, a question for you on – one of the guys that’s been in the news a lot is this Mahmoud Khalil guy. He’s a Hamasnik America hater, was at Columbia University. They’re trying to revoke his green card. He’s become this cause célèbre. He’s still here. They had him in detention, then they had to release him. Is it really worth all that effort for one dirtbag like this to try to get him out of the country? I mean, I’m all for it. He should have been gone a long time ago. But, obviously, this is vis-à-vis the kind of due process obstacles in the way. Is it worth it to pursue this kind of case and get him out of the country?
MR. O’BRIEN: Yeah, without a doubt. Part of the problem where people are uncomfortable with this is they haven’t seen it happening because it hasn’t been going on. I mean, I worked for ICE for years, and I worked in a program where I was based in a prison in Upstate New York and we were dealing with – everyone was an aggravated felon. And at the time there was not a whole lot of other enforcement going on.
And so I think the point you make about the body armor versus the briefcase enforcement is an important one, but there’s an aspect to the body armor enforcement that you didn’t mention, which is deterrence. And so, you know, most of us, if we know there’s not a state trooper around on our way in on 395, are going to go a little higher than the speed limit if we know we can get away with it. But most of us also don’t go 120 miles an hour because we know that there are state troopers out there and we’re going to get a massive ticket if we get caught. Well, for decades, you know, INS and ICE as its successor were not visible anywhere except if you lived in the Southwest and were along the border. And so it’s a – you know, it’s long been a regular occurrence for somebody who lives in the Southwest to run into a Border Patrol agent because they’re all deputized as local deputies and assist on mutual aid with regular law enforcement. So you tend to get less of a shock there when, you know, CBP does its job or ICE does its job.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Right.
MR. O’BRIEN: But you know, here in this part of the world, unless you’re in Miami or certain neighborhoods in New York, you really haven’t seen any enforcement. And people in the United States – I think it’s been amply, you know, demonstrated by the George Floyd situation – their understanding of what law enforcement looks like is driven by television programs. And even with bodycam footage regularly available and all over YouTube, it still hasn’t been overtaken by reality. And so people think that –
MR. KRIKORIAN: So they’re still thinking of “Law and Order” episodes or something like that.
MR. O’BRIEN: Exactly, and they don’t understand that sometimes the bad guys fight back and that the police are left with – law enforcement, including, you know, ICE and CBP are left with no option except to respond with force. And you know, we have several generations of people who have not been involved in or standing by anyone who was involved in a violent conflict. If you look at the – you know, the ’80s, we had several generations of men that had been in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, and were habituated to what violence really actually looked like, and were less likely to get upset by it. And the fact is, there’s a fantastic book written by an Israeli professor named Martin van Creveld called “Pussycats,” and he says that one of the biggest things that’s affecting the West is the West is peaceful and therefore we’re not used to seeing horrible things that have to be done to preserve, you know, tranquility, peace, and order on a regular basis.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Right. It’s – yeah.
MR. O’BRIEN: But in places like Israel or certain parts of the developing world, you know, viciousness is a regular part of the average everyday culture and it’s a necessity of survival.
And so I think part of the problem that has affected this and the situation in Minnesota is you have people who watched this whole thing and nobody stopped for a minute and said: That woman just attempted to run over two law enforcement agents in a 4,500-pound missile.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Right.
MR. O’BRIEN: But they got upset when the law enforcement agents did what any reasonable person would expect a law enforcement agent to do when their life was threatened that way. And so I think that’s a major part of the problem.
MR. KRIKORIAN: It’s kind of like – I don’t know if Orwell said this or somebody else, is you sleep peacefully at night because there are hard men willing to do violence on your behalf.
MR. O’BRIEN: Yes.
MR. KRIKORIAN: And we’ve completely forgotten that.
And this is a question, I guess, for everybody because it kind of does relate to Europe as well as the United States. We have a question on birthright citizenship, but I want to keep it specifically about the enforcement side. Europe generally doesn’t have birthright citizenship anymore, automatic birthright citizenship for any illegal alien. We still do. Does that make it harder to deport illegal immigrants as a practical matter or not? Because if you’re an illegal immigrant and you have kids, it gives you no legal right to stay here but, you know, it makes it practically harder. But Europe doesn’t have birthright citizenship, but they can’t deport anybody either. So I don’t know, any thoughts on that?
MR. MARSAI: Yeah. And it’s an interesting point, Mark, because it’s not only about staying, not only about working or getting the social welfare, but what’s going on both in the United States and Europe to finally get the citizenship. And the barriers between the citizen of certain countries and the immigrants who arrive, many times legally it’s vanishing, you know. So almost each European country softened naturalization law in the last year. So Germans, from eight to five year residency, then for three, now back again by five. Also, in the United States if you are an accepted asylum seeker – so, refugees, you have to apply for the green card within one –
MR. KRIKORIAN: After one year.
MR. MARSAI: So, actually, it’s the path towards citizenship.
And I think it’s very important difference between us and, for example, Japan or South Korea that getting the Japanese citizenship, even if you are 20 years in the country, is almost impossible. So – and not accidental that people coming to Europe and the United States, because they have the perspective and foresight future that they will get the citizenship anyway, you know, while there’s no possibility for Japan and, again, the Gulf states, which are, OK, not democratic.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Yeah.
MR. MARSAI: But the barrier is clear. Ninety percent of the population there is an immigrant population, and it’s never a social security or sovereignty issue because these guys no – it’s like there is no any chance to get the citizenship.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Interesting. And if your experience, Matt, as an immigration judge, or even in your fraud investigation and all the rest of it, you know, does it complicate removing people when they have kids here who become U.S. citizens automatically?
MR. O’BRIEN: Well, the answer is legally no. There’s absolutely nothing –
MR. KRIKORIAN: Yeah, I understand, but I mean – in the real world, I mean.
MR. O’BRIEN: Well, you know, I think we have a crisis in the courts in the United States where the general public has come to see the courts as these kind of Solomonic referees for all of society’s problems.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Right.
MR. O’BRIEN: And I hear people all the time say things like, well, you have to realize in the United States anybody can sue anybody for anything. Well, that’s not true. In order to get into a court, you need a cause of action. And unfortunately, I think a significant portion of our judiciary has willingly accepted that role. And so is it problematic as a legal matter? No. It’s problematic because you will frequently have judges ignore their obligations under the law and make decisions that, you know, they consider equitable decisions, like they were operating in a Medieval court of equity, on behalf of people because they don’t want to inconvenience the person who broke the law. Their child would not be a citizen but for the fact that they broke the law, and the judges buy into these sob stories and these flawed legal arguments.
And you know, when I was learning how to practice law, generally speaking the fruits of your crime are not equities; they’re additional crimes. And so I think that there is a problem with the mythology surrounding this because it acts as a magnet, because many of the aliens believe that if they have children who are citizens they can’t be removed or it’ll be relatively easy for them to then get a green card and be on a path to citizenship. And I think it’s a mythology problem in terms of jurists who don’t understand or take their obligations seriously, who then make decisions they have no legal authority to make thinking that they’re doing God’s work.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Right. Jim, we’ve got about a minute left if you have any last thoughts, especially on how to – how to get more – a larger share of liberals and moderates behind immigration enforcement.
MR. ROBB: Right. Well, there is something to build on because, especially on the deporting people who have additional crimes when they’re in the country, there’s still a high level of support. I think Democrats, especially, are holding onto this as, like, look, we can be taken seriously. So I think build on that and emphasize that most of the people we’re going after are criminals, by the way. And so it’s messaging and public relations, but politics is about that these days.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Right.
MR. O’BRIEN: I think that’s part of the reason we have the problem, though, because we have led everyone to believe that it’s OK to be an illegal alien and you have to commit some kind of another crime before you become a problem.
MR. KRIKORIAN: Right, I agree. No, no, I agree, yeah.
MR. O’BRIEN: So I don’t – I don’t know that –
MR. KRIKORIAN: And the president has contributed to that by talking about deporting criminals specifically.
Well, thank you, gentlemen. We’re getting to an hour. And I think this was a useful discussion. For those of you watching live, this is also being recorded and will be posted on our site at CIS.org, and we’ll have links to the various participants here if you want to follow up in their work as well. And the INIR website – the International Network for Immigration Research – is also online. It’s INIRnet.org – INIRnet.org, that’s right, isn’t it, Viktor?
MR. MARSAI: Yeah, yeah.
MR. KRIKORIAN: And there’s a journal that INIR publishes, an academic journal on migration, as well as various papers and what have you.
So thank you, gentlemen. Thank you all for watching. And we will, obviously, keep grappling with this issue of whether democratic societies can actually deport significant numbers of people. We may have what they call in social science a social experiment going on – (laughter) – to see whether this is possible, so stay tuned. Thank you.
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