Thanks to fraud revelations and ICE Operation Metro Surge in Minnesota, the Somali community in the United States has come under extended media scrutiny and become the focal point of political debates. Most analyses concentrate on the relationship between American Somalis – and their supporters – and federal agencies, mostly ICE. These articles present the situation as a homogenous East African community facing deportation by immigration enforcement, and many websites and media reports emphasize the solidarity that allows the local community to stand up to the “federal aggressors”.
In fact, Somali communities in the Twin Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, and in the United States overall, are far from united. As in Somalia and other parts of the world with Somali diasporas, their communities are highly divided along actual or perceived kinship, descent, and lineage – the clan system.
Although some argue that the clan system does not really matter and/or it is more the result of political and social construction of colonizers than an indigenous part of Somali society, historical sources prove the opposite. For instance, I.M. Lewis’s classic A Modern History of the Somali examines how the insurgency led by the great Somali national hero Sayyid Moḥammad Abdallah Hassan was more a clan- and religion-based struggle for grazing lands and political power than an anti-colonial campaign. Furthermore, since the British government had practiced only very loose indirect rule in Somaliland for the couple of years preceding the insurgency, it is unlikely that they managed to orchestrate clannism within such a short period. The files of the Kenyan National Archives from the late 19th century British administration that ruled southern Somali-inhabited areas also demonstrate that clan competition, and sometimes clashes, were an integral part of Somali society before colonization.
Even if we accept that clannism is a mere political and social construct, the fact remains that the last four decades of Somali politics were to a great extent determined by the politicization of clans. The “clan cleansing”1 of the early 1990s and fights between warlords occurred mainly along clan lines, where “non-noble” clans like Bantu (Jareer) Somalis were the main target of violence.2 This was the period when the first wave of Somalis – including Ilhan Omar – arrived in the United States through humanitarian resettlement programs.
Clans were the main actors not only in the struggle for economic and political power, but also in the way Somali elites institutionalized their influence. Through the so-called 4.5 formula, which guaranteed a fixed share of governmental and parliamentary positions for the bigger clans, the federal system transformed Somalia into a clan-federation where instead of ordinary citizens, the gatekeepers of the clans determine the future of the country along primordial structures. To understand how deeply entrenched clan politics is in Somalia, it is enough to have a look at the current debates around the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections: while the incumbent government is arguing for a one person–one vote model, the opposition – supported by federal member states – is insisting on the 4.5 clan formula.
Mimicking Somalia, clans in the diaspora are not only the cause of social division but also the driver of political competition.
Of course, clan relations and identities are not fixed: they are often fluid and flexible. Yet, anybody who denies the role of clans in Somali politics is rejecting reality. Even Somalia’s most “anti-clan” organization, al-Shabaab, is highly determined by internal clan dynamics.
Consequently, it is not surprising that Somali diasporas are also divided along clan affiliation. Even small Somali communities reproduce it: the author met people in Hungary – where no more than a few dozen Somalis live – who could not be part of the community because they originated from “non-noble” clans. Research among Somalis in Europe and North America also supports the notion that the East African community brought with itself not only its language, religion, and culture, but clan divisions as well.3 As one Somali from Minnesota responded to the Twin Cities Daily Planet question “Do Somali people still practice the clan system in Minnesota?” in 2011: “Yes, they do. All you have to do is go to the Starbucks coffee shop on Riverside. Every Somali tribe probably sends about five men to represent them at that coffeehouse. These men leave their kids and wives to sit there and argue over who started the 20-something year civil war back home. … Sadly we didn’t leave the tribe business behind.” The problem of clannism in Minnesota is so complex and runs so deep that a Somali group organized an “Anti-Tribalism Movement Reconciliation Conference” at the Cedar Cultural Center in Minneapolis to mitigate tension between certain fractions of the community.
Mimicking Somalia, clans in the diaspora are not only the cause of social division but also the driver of political competition. The same is also true for the United States where the “culture transplant” of clan politics shapes local political struggles in areas hosting bigger Somali communities – like the Twin Cities. In sum, it seems that the true social and political construct is not the clans but the notion of unity among Somalis.
The Somali clan system cannot be demolished overnight. To some extent, it could provide a short-term safety net for community members. Yet, in many cases the clan system serves as a solid base for political manipulation and inciting hatred between Somali groups.
If we analyze certain cases, it is evident how Somali clan relations shape local US political dynamics. At the end of 2025, just before Operation Metro Surge, a fierce debate swept across Somali social media about the contested mayoral election in Minneapolis. After a long and emotional campaign, the incumbent Jacob Frey won a third consecutive term as mayor of the city, defeating his closest challenger, State Senator Omar Fateh. What made the electoral campaign particularly remarkable was how it highlighted the internal divisions of the Somali community — primarily between members of the two big clan families, the Hawiye and the Daarood, who rallied behind different candidates. Two of the most important protagonists of the campaign were congresswoman Ilhan Omar, who supported Fateh, and her ex-husband, Ahmed Hersi, who backed Frey. This was not just a family division. The efforts of Ilhan – who comes from the Osman Mahmood/Majerteen/Daarood subclan – enjoyed the support of the broader Daarood community in the city, while Hersi could lean on the rival clan family, the Hawiye. As the Suna Times emphasized, “after Frey’s victory, jubilant celebrations erupted among Somali Hawiye youth and activists across Facebook, TikTok, and other platforms, where videos and livestreams showcased people waving American and Somali flags, chanting victory slogans, and congratulating Ahmed Hersi’s camp. In contrast, Omar Fateh’s supporters expressed deep frustration and disappointment, accusing local political groups and social media influencers of dividing the community along tribal lines.” As regards the election, many videos explaining the background of clan conflict and preferences underlying the position of the different groups went viral, generating hundreds of comments.
Somali clan relations influence not only politics but also crime. According to FBI reports, Somali ethnic-based criminal gangs in the Twin Cities, including Somali Mafia, Lady Outlaws, and Somali Outlaws, are organized along clan lines, and clan rivalry is often the most important reason for gang violence. It is particularly sad that some Somalis who had escaped from war in the Horn of Africa arrived in Minnesota only to be killed on US soil.
Clan violence is fueled not only in the offline space. More and more Somali TikTokers and Youtubers are using online platforms to glorify their own clan tradition and savage rival groups. In many cases, tens of thousands of people are following these accounts and add hundreds of comments. The inflammatory effects spill over from the online: as the example of the infamous Germany-based Somali TikToker, Ayub Abdirizak shows, these influencers utilize their clout to support violence in their country of residence and in Somalia.
The Somali clan system cannot be demolished overnight. To some extent, it could provide a short-term safety net for community members. Yet, in many cases the clan system serves as a solid base for political manipulation and inciting hatred between Somali groups. Therefore, if Somalis would like to live a peaceful life in the United States, they have to leave behind their old divisions – including the clans.
End Notes
1 Lidwien Kapteijns: Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Legacy of 1991. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012.
2 Mohamed A. Eno: The Bantu-Jareer Somalis: Unearthing Apartheid in the Horn of Africa. London, Adonis & Abbey Pub Ltd, 2008.
3 Abdulkadir Osman Farah, Mammo Muchie, and Joakim Gundel (eds.): Somalia: Diaspora and State Reconstruction in the Horn of Africa. Adonis and Abbe Publishers Ltd., London, 2007.