Countering Migrant Smuggling in the Med Will Be Measured by Deeds, Not Words

By Dan Cadman on May 6, 2015

Twice in past weeks I've addressed the migrant smuggling crisis unfolding in Mediterranean waters, with the attendant tragedies that always seem to accompany chaotic and uncontrolled mass illegal migration. (See here and here.)

European Union leaders have been struggling with how to contain the movement of tens of thousands of intended migrants showing up on the northern coast of Africa to attempt their water-borne smuggling passage through the Med. Recently, they've publicized a 10-point plan.

 


Looking through the plan, I see several important initiatives, but overall I'm left with doubt that it will succeed in abating the traffic in the way and to the extent that they hope.

Take, for instance, Item 1, adding financial and maritime resources to the patrols. This is of course absolutely critical, but it takes no wizard to recognize that the costs will be astronomical — a conclusion the smugglers have probably also reached, in which case they will simply out-wait the increased patrols until contributing nations get tired of the fiscal burden and slow down again. Meanwhile, the smuggling ventures will almost certainly become nocturnal in this cat-and-mouse game, adding to the risk of additional deaths.

Item 2, seizing and destroying vessels, is also critical. Some might decry the destruction portion of the equation as draconian, and suggest opting instead for seizure and confiscation. This would be a mistake. A quick reminiscence to make my point: When I was a young investigator with not too many years on the job, I (like so many others) was detailed to Miami during the Mariel boatlift and assigned to work in the anti-smuggling task force. One of the vessels we investigated was the Red Diamond, a scow that brought more than 700 Cubans to our shores; the most landed by any single vessel. The Red Diamond had formerly been the property of the United States government, but was seized and forfeited for having been used to smuggle drugs and was later sold by the Marshals Service — almost certainly to straw buyers on behalf of criminal principals who once again put it to illicit purposes — until being seized for its part in the Mariel surge and becoming a part of history.

But make no doubt, even destruction of vessels can be of limited use. Apparently the smugglers agree, if media reports are to be believed. This is because many of the vessels used are in shockingly poor condition and deliberately purchased as the equivalent of single-use throwaways by smugglers. Probably the only ones dissuaded by confiscation and destruction will be fishermen who have been supplementing their income by moving migrants northward, and who don't want to lose their main source of income.

But the weak points in the items I've been describing aren't what cast success into doubt. It is the emphasis on landing within EU space and resettlement of migrants that will tilt the plan in favor of continuing migratory arrivals. Look, for instance, at items 4 and 7, which are outlined not as possibilities, but as "going to happens".

By contrast, look at item 6 ("consider options for an emergency relocation mechanism") and item 8 ("establish a new return programme"), which are both couched in vague future generalities.

The Europeans don't seem to have learned from the U.S. example at our own southern land border — when governments act in loco coyote, to coin a phrase, and perfect the smuggling venture. By picking up the migrants, taking them where they wanted to go in the first place, and then arranging processing and resettlement, the U.S. government not only make the smugglers' jobs easier (and more lucrative), but they encourage continued flows. Intended migrants are desperate, but not stupid; they see through the tough words and look at end results in making their go/no-go decisions.