
On November 18, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) — the DOJ tribunal that reviews immigration decisions — issued an opinion in Matter of K-L-S-, affirming an immigration judge’s (IJ’s) adverse credibility determination and her conclusion that an alien had filed a “frivolous asylum” application. That’s not remarkable, but what is remarkable is how the Board excoriated not only the applicant in this case for his asylum lies, but also countless others like him, and the manner in which it placed aliens’ attorneys on notice about pushing such claims. The BIA is fed up — and it didn’t hold back.
K-L-S-
Aliens in removal proceedings are referred to as “respondents”, and the respondent here, K-L-S-, is an Indian national removable on unspecified grounds who filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) — also referred to as “statutory withholding”— and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
The respondent claimed he’d suffered past and feared future persecution on account of his membership in the Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar (Mann) party at the hands of members of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).
When he was in India, K-L-S- contended, he was confronted by four BJP members while he was hanging posters supporting the Mann party, and the four “tore down the posters, punched him, and told him to join their party”.
When he tried to report this abuse to the police, he alleged, the local cops “refused to take a report and threatened to jail or file false charges against him for making a claim against the ruling party”.
Thereafter, K-L-S- was returning on a motorbike after doing work “for a poor girl’s wedding” when he was again assaulted by BJS members (one of whom he recognized) who were driving in a car that bore a BJS emblem.
Consequently, he fled to the United States and sought asylum.
Asylum under Section 208 of the INA
Under section 208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), “Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States ... may apply for asylum.”
To be granted asylum under that provision, an alien must establish he is a “refugee” as defined in section 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA, that is a person unable or unwilling to return home due to past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”.
Persecution claims premised upon political party membership or activity like this one are among the most straightforward, and hence protection under section 208 of the INA is often erroneously referred to as “political asylum”.
“Frivolous” Asylum Claims
Section 208(d)(6) of the INA renders aliens who make frivolous asylum claims “permanently ineligible” for any immigration benefits under the INA, and section 208(d)(4)(A) of the act requires IJs to advise applicants of the consequences of filing a “frivolous application for asylum”.
The statute, however, does not define what a “frivolous application for asylum” is, with Congress leaving it up to DOJ and DHS to flesh out the term by regulation and precedent.
As I explained in July 2020, the Clinton administration produced a milquetoast regulation (at then 8 C.F.R. § 208.20) limiting the scope of frivolous asylum to applications in which “any of the material elements” are “deliberately fabricated”, confines Congress likely didn’t intend when it added the “frivolous asylum bar” to section 208 in 1996.
DHS and DOJ took a second crack at it under Trump I, and consequently 8 C.F.R. § 1208.20(c) now states that asylum applications filed after January 11, 2021 (the effective date of those changes) are considered frivolous if they either: (1) contain a “fabricated material element”; (2) are “premised upon false or fabricated evidence” (unless they “would have been granted without” such evidence); (3) are “filed without regard to the merits of the claim”; or (4) are “clearly foreclosed by applicable law”.
Adverse Credibility Findings
Having done the job, I can assure you that one of the more difficult IJ duties is making “adverse credibility” findings in protection cases, that is, telling an asylum applicant you think his evidence isn’t credible and/or that he’s lying.
That’s especially true when the claim is premised upon unspeakable abuse and unconscionable harm, but fortunately Congress in 2005 amended the INA to provide a template for IJs to follow in making “credibility determinations” in asylum cases.
Specifically, section 208(b)(1)(B)(iii) now states, in pertinent part:
a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements ... the internal consistency of each such statement. . . and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements..
In making an adverse credibility finding, an IJ must provide “specific and cogent reasons for determining” that the claim is not credible and must consider the credibility of the claim in “the totality of the circumstances”, that is in the context of the application as a whole.
As an aside, I drafted that provision (with later amendments) as a congressional staffer based upon a wide-ranging survey of credibility factors in case law and later applied it hundreds of times as an IJ.
The Inconsistent Evidence
Which brings me to all the inconsistencies the IJ and BIA identified in K-L-S-‘s asylum application.
First, the immigration court determined that the respondent “gave inconsistent testimony about how he was beaten, variously describing being kicked and punched or being hit with sticks and batons”, information K-L-S- didn’t think of as that important.
Second, the respondent’s testimony was inconsistent with respect to his injuries, and in particular, “which side of his body they were on and how they were sustained”, and the IJ also concluded that the testimony K-L-S- offered on the medical treatment he received for those injuries was not only “internally inconsistent”, but it was also “inconsistent with his witness’ testimony about such treatment”.
Moreover, the IJ noted that the respondent’s testimony about his political work was inconsistent with the documentary evidence he submitted.
“The respondent asserted that his work for the Mann party involved tasks like setting up tents and chairs, distributing food and water, unloading trucks, and hanging posters.” So far, so good.
The problem was that K-L-S- “submitted a statement from an alleged party official on Mann party letterhead”, which claimed he “spoke on behalf of the party at various rallies” and averred that he “is a terrific orator” and “influenced a lot of people to join” the party.
When confronted with this glaring discrepancy, the respondent eventually confirmed “he never spoke at party rallies”, conceded “the substance of the statement regarding his party activities was inaccurate”, claimed that his mother sent it to him, and admitted that he had no idea when it was created.
If that wasn’t enough, the IJ also “found that affidavits claiming to be from neighbors and the respondent’s mother were not credible because, other than the individual identifying information, the affidavits are identical, nearly word for word”, and in fact used “the same phrases” and included “the same typographical and grammatical errors”.
The IJ:
also observed that the affidavit allegedly from the respondent’s mother is essentially a carbon copy of the others and bears no additional information about matters of which she should have personal knowledge, such as the treatment the respondent claims he received from the police or the killing of the respondent’s father allegedly by BJP members.
Then there was the fact that DHS handed up redacted copies of 20 other declarations submitted in other cases that “set forth stories with ‘glaring similarities’” to K-L-S-‘s and that were “unlikely the result of coincidence”.
“Specifically”, the BIA noted:
each affidavit states that the affiant worked for a political party in India hanging posters and was accosted by opposing party members who tore down the posters and told the affiant to join their party; the affiant reported this to the police, who refused to take a report because it involved a certain political party and then threatened to arrest the affiant for making a false report; and the affiant was subsequently accosted while on a motorcycle after leaving a party, such as a marriage ceremony.
Consistent with precedent, K-L-S- was given the opportunity to respond to the “undeniable” fact that his claim was factually similar to those “made by 20 other asylum applicants”, but the best he could muster on appeal was an argument that it was “possible that the respondent’s and the other 20 applicants’ claims could all be true”.
“Fraud, Forgery and Fabrication Are So Common They Are Routinely Tolerated”
Eventually we all come to a breaking point, and the BIA has plainly arrived at that juncture as it relates to asylum fraud.
The Board began its frivolousness analysis by quoting at length from the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Angov v. Lynch, first for the proposition that “an unfortunate reality ... makes immigration cases so different from all other American adjudications: Fraud, forgery and fabrication are so common — and so difficult to prove — that they are routinely tolerated.”
As both the circuit court and the BIA continued:
The schizophrenic way we administer our immigration laws creates an environment where lying and forgery are difficult to disprove, richly rewarded if successful and rarely punished if unsuccessful. This toxic combination creates a moral hazard to which many asylum applicants fall prey.
First, there’s an “incalculable benefit” associated with “gaining a lawful foothold in America”, particularly “for many living in poverty throughout the world” and as a result, “Telling an elaborate lie, and coming up with forged documents and mendacious witnesses to back it up, is nothing at all when the stakes are so high.”
Then there’s the fact that “the risk of getting caught is low” because fraud in the immigration context is “difficult to detect”.
As the Angov court explained:
There's very little the United States can do to investigate obscure incidents that allegedly occurred in countries on the other side of the globe. Even if it were economically feasible, we can't send the FBI into a foreign country to conduct a full field investigation. The best we can do is to have consular personnel check basic facts, in addition to the many other functions they perform. ... All told, there are fewer than 6000 consular officials in embassies and consulates spread out across more than 170 countries.
...
Finally, if an alien does get caught lying or committing fraud, nothing very bad happens to him. Sure, he may be ordered removed, but most aliens who aren't in custody remain here long after their removal orders become final. ... And if they do get sent back — at our expense — what's lost? They wind up where they started. Would-be immigrants almost never get prosecuted for presenting forged documents in support of asylum petitions, unless they commit some additional misconduct. [Citations omitted.]
Nearly all that analysis was cited with approval by the Board in Matter of K-L-S-, because it’s undeniable.
“Immigration fraud” is a high reward/low risk endeavor — which is why in general, as the BIA explained, it “is rampant, and cases involving fraudulent asylum claims are distressingly common” (cleaned up).
“It Is Clear That This Case Involves Immigration Fraud”
The Board made short work of finding that Matter of K-L-S- “involves immigration fraud” and that K-L-S- “filed a frivolous asylum application”.
The BIA found that the IJ correctly “determined that the various discrepancies and anomalies in the record evidence involve material elements of the respondent’s claim and go to the very heart of his account of persecution”.
“Virtually every aspect of the respondent’s claim has obvious inconsistencies”, the IJ held, “from his role in the Mann party to the injuries he sustained to whether he went into hiding afterward”, indicating he deliberately fabricated that claim.
Further, the Board sustained the IJ’s conclusion that it was “‘inconceivable’ that 20 other individuals could have such precisely similar experiences carried out in precisely the same sequence in different time periods and by different actors”.
Appellate Arguments Were “Nonsensical” and “Unpersuasive”
The BIA also concluded that the respondent’s arguments on appeal were “nonsensical, not supported by the law or the factual record, and unpersuasive”.
First, the respondent argued that the author of the Mann party letter “may have mislabeled speaking in small gatherings as speaking at rallies”, but the Board noted that the respondent failed to point to any “evidence to support his claim” and concluded that it is unbelievable that the author of that letter “would describe the respondent as a ‘terrific orator’ who spoke at various political rallies”, when he simply meant K-L-S- “spoke about the party at small gatherings”.
As for the similarities in the 20 other asylum affidavits, K-L-S- first argued that the preparers of those documents may not have known that “each affiant should have their own unique affidavit”, an argument that makes neither legal nor factual sense and one that the Board again dismissed as “unbelievable”.
Next, he contended that “the similarities between his and the 20 other asylum applicants’ claims could be the result of their bona fide experiences”.
In response, the BIA concluded (for a third time) that, “It is ... unbelievable that the glaring similarities between the respondent’s claim and that of 20 other asylum applicants resulted from all of these persons sharing nearly factually identical experiences.”
A Warning to Lawyers
“More importantly”, the BIA held, respondent’s arguments about preparer error and possible coincidence in those affidavits “lack any evidentiary support in the record. Simply presenting hypothetical arguments and suggested alternative views of the evidence is not sufficient to establish clear error in” an IJ’s factual finding.
At that point, the Board put not only aliens who file questionable asylum claims but also their attorneys on notice.
Citing to the Supreme Court’s 1985 opinion in INS v. Rios-Pineda, the BIA acknowledged that an alien who is “illegally present in the United States” and “who wishes to remain has a substantial incentive to prolong litigation in order to delay physical deportation for as long as possible” (cleaned up).
But as the justices made clear there: “The purpose of an appeal is to correct legal errors which occurred at the initial determination of deportability; it is not to permit an indefinite stalling of physical departure in the hope of eventually satisfying legal prerequisites.”
Applying that finding and relevant regulations to this case, the BIA held that “causing unnecessary delay in the outcome of the proceeding is a clearly improper purpose for an appeal” and that “an appeal based merely on conjecture and speculation lacks ‘an arguable basis in fact or in law,’ serves no purpose other than to create delay, and is legally inappropriate” (emphasis added).
Consequently, the BIA warned that “Counsel should recognize that filing a frivolous appeal may result in sanction” under state bar provisions that follow Rule 3.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which begins:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.
Telling It Like It Is
Fraud is pervasive in immigration because the risks are low and the possible rewards — a green card and the benefits of U.S. citizenship — are lavish. But the Board of Immigration Appeals has now clearly stated that it’s fed up with asylum lies, and it’s putting aliens and their lawyers on notice that it’s had enough.