One question before the American people is whether the legislative substance of what the "Gang of Eight" has presented lives up to its loftily stated ideals.
The sentiments are stirring, and beyond reproach. Who could be against securing "the sovereignty of the United States of America"? Who would oppose keeping "our country safe and prosperous"? And what critic of the current immigration system would rail against "establishing a safe, just, and efficient immigration system"?
The difficulties with the legislation proposed by the Gang of Eight have nothing to do with their professed ideals; they are exemplary. But they have everything to do with its substance of the legislation and the political process by which it came into being.
Two of the bill's sponsors, Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.), introduced their efforts to Wall Street Journal readers by touting the fact that their "group's effort included the active participation of some of the most conservative and liberal members of the Senate." The message of that sentence is: If we on different sides of the partisan divide can agree on a bill, it should give you, the public, confidence that what we have agreed to is a successful bipartisan effort to find common ground that merits your support.
The problem with this appeal is that it equates having members of both parties sign on to a bill with their having achieved a real compromise. They have not and the bill reflects that fact. In the bill as it currently stands, one side gets the actual policies it wanted, while the other side gets promises for the policies they endorse.
Yes, the eight Senate members who agreed to the bill consist of equal numbers of Democrats and Republicans. But that doesn't mean that the group was balanced in a way that makes the most difference: that they actually considered a wide range of options.
As noted, the group deliberated in secret, so we can't say for certain what they considered and what options never received their attention. It does seem very safe to say that the center of policy gravity in that committee was the urgent desire to do something to "fix" America's "broken immigration system".
Their legislation adapts the premises of the failed grand bargain efforts of the past, with which several of the senior members of the group had been involved. The basic operating assumption of the group was that they felt they had to go big — to fix it all at one time. In short, they felt they needed, and certainly wanted, a "grand bargain".
Grand bargains can be useful, if they genuinely reflect hard choices and genuine compromises and not just the appearance of them. This legislation does not.
In reality, instant legalization of illegal aliens (the liberal wish) to be followed by future efforts at increased border and interior immigration enforcement (the conservative wish) require real immigration reformists to trade a promise for a fact. It may well be a "compromise", but it is an unequal and inequitable one because one side gets want they want (legalization) immediately and the other side has to wait and hope it gets its major policy goals (effective enforcement) somewhere down the road, years in the future, if at all.
Policy goals delayed can easily become policy denied.
Next: A Political Not a Substantive Process