

# **The Fiscal Consequences of Parole During the Biden Administration**

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The decision by the Biden administration to parole nearly three million otherwise inadmissible aliens into the country represents a profound distortion of the intent of the program, which is supposed to be used on a limited case-by-case basis due to compelling humanitarian need or because of a significant benefit to the United States. My testimony will focus on the fiscal consequences of this policy. The limited information available indicates that recent parolees are almost certainly a net fiscal drain — creating more in costs than they pay in taxes. This is primarily due to their relatively low average education levels, resulting in low average earnings and tax payments. Their lower average incomes allow a large share to qualify for means-tested programs. About half of households headed by newly arrived immigrants from the primary parolee-sending countries receive welfare. Recent male parolees have a relatively high rate of work. However, given the realities of the modern American economy, our extensive social safety net, and progressive system of taxation, allowing large numbers of less-educated people into the country unavoidably creates fiscal costs. This fact should be a key consideration when formulating policy.

#### **Key Findings:**

- The Center for Immigration Studies estimates that an unprecedented 2.86 million people were granted parole during the Biden administration.
- The enormous scale of parole during the prior administration makes it very hard to believe that parole was actually granted on a case-by-case basis as the law requires.
- Educational attainment is a key determinant of income, tax payments, and use of means-tested programs. New adult immigrants from virtually every top parolee-sending country are significantly less educated than U.S.-born adults.
- The average wages of newly arrived adult immigrant men from most of the primary parolee-sending countries are less than half those of U.S.-born men.

- Households headed by recent immigrants from virtually every major parolee-sending country have substantially higher welfare use than U.S.-born households. On average, about half of households headed by immigrants from the top parolee-sending countries access one or more welfare programs — nearly twice the rate of U.S.-born households.
- Parolees are able to access welfare for a number of reasons: First, some have U.S.-born children. Second, those paroled for at least one year are considered “qualified aliens”, with the welfare eligibility of new lawful permanent residents, while others have immediate access. Third, all residents can access some programs (e.g. WIC and Medicaid for pregnant women). Fourth, some states offer welfare to otherwise ineligible aliens.
- In addition to traditional welfare programs, 40 percent of households headed by recent immigrants from the primary parolee-sending countries have incomes low enough to receive the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Those receiving the EITC pay no federal income tax and instead receive a cash payment.
- Immigrants from the top parolee-sending countries do pay taxes, including federal income and payroll taxes. However, on average parolee-headed households have only about 47 percent the federal tax liability of native-headed households.
- The fiscal drain created by high welfare use and lower average tax contributions by immigrants from parolee-sending countries is not caused by low rates of work. Working-age men (18 to 64) from parolee-sending countries generally have rates of work that match or exceed those of U.S.-born men.
- By working and consuming, parolees add tens of billions of dollars to the nation’s GDP each year, but this is not a measure of their tax contributions or the benefits they create for Americans. Almost all of the increase in economic activity they create goes to the parolees themselves in the form of wages.

## **Introduction**

The Immigration and Nationality Act remains the country’s foundational immigration law. That law allows the attorney general to “parole” aliens into the United States. It states: “The Secretary of Homeland Security may ... in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien.”<sup>1</sup>

It is important to note that the law is clear that it is not a program to be used *en masse* but instead parole is to be granted only on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, those granted parole are not considered to be formally admitted to the country. Further, when the reason for the parole no longer exists, the parolee should be returned to DHS custody, and the alien is to be dealt with in the same way as any other person trying to be admitted into the United States. Center for Immigration Studies Resident Fellow in Law and Policy Andrew Arthur's publication "Biden Has Paroled In Two Million-Plus Inadmissible Aliens" provides a valuable overview of the Biden administration's approach to parole.<sup>2</sup> For the history of parole and the legal framework surrounding it, see Center legal fellow George Fishman's detailed analysis entitled "The Pernicious Perversion of Parole: A 70-year battle between Congress and the president".<sup>3</sup>

Parolees are eligible to apply for employment authorization (8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(11)). Further, after one year, those granted parole are eligible for federal welfare benefits to the same extent as any lawful permanent residents (8 U.S.C. §§ 1613(a), 1641(b)(4)). Due to specific policies and legal provisions, most parolees from Cuba, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Ukraine have much more immediate access to welfare programs.<sup>4</sup> This eligibility for means-tested programs has important implications for public coffers. As we will see, recent immigrants from the primary parolee-sending countries make heavy use of the nation's welfare system. As a result, there is every reason to believe this will be the case for recent parolees.

## **Number Of Parolees under Biden**

The government does not make it easy to determine how many people were granted parole in recent years. In a recent analysis, my colleague at the Center for Immigration Studies Andrew Arthur estimated that 2.86 million illegal immigrants had been granted asylum during the Biden presidency.<sup>5</sup> He is a former immigration judge and a leading expert on parole and the administrative data documenting its scale. To date, Arthur has compiled the most complete estimate of parole during the prior administration. At some point the government may release its own comprehensive report on the number of individuals granted parole during the Biden administration. For this testimony, I will rely on Arthur's analysis.

**Andrew Arthur's Analysis.** His analysis is mainly based on the Excel spreadsheets at the DHS Office of Homeland Security Statistics (OHSS) website, as well as published reports by Customs and Border Protection (CBP).<sup>6</sup> Based on these sources, Arthur finds 2.86 million individuals were granted parole from February 2021, when President Biden took office, to January 2025, when he left. This breaks down by year in the following fashion: 58,730 in FY 2021; 721,671 in FY 2022; 1,087,267 in FY 2023 and 897,794 in FY2 024. These figures include Afghans granted parole as part of "Operation Allies Welcome/Refuge" following the chaotic evacuation from Afghanistan and Ukrainians released as part of Uniting for Ukraine.<sup>7</sup> Arthur observes that "Congress largely acquiesced" to these actions, but he adds that Congress "never okayed border

releases”. His estimate also includes inadmissible aliens granted parole during the Biden presidency as part of the CHNV program for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans.

## The Fiscal Impact of Recent Parolees

**Educational attainment.** One of the largest and most important studies on the fiscal impact of immigrants was a 2017 study by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. That study found that the education level of immigrants is a key factor that determines fiscal impact.<sup>8</sup> A 2024 Manhattan Institute study also concludes that educational attainment is the key factor that determines an immigrant’s net fiscal impact.<sup>9</sup>

The reasons for this are straightforward. Education determines what type of jobs immigrants typically do and their resulting incomes. Income matters enormously because it affects both tax payments and eligibility for means-tested government programs. Unfortunately, it is not possible to estimate the education level of recent parolees precisely, mainly because that information is not collected by the government from parolees. However, it is possible to use Census Bureau data, particularly the Current Population Survey, to estimate the education level of recently arrived immigrants from the primary parolee-sending countries.<sup>10</sup> Due to sample size limitations the results for some individual countries reported should be interpreted with caution.

**Education Level by Countries.** Table 1 reports the education level of recent immigrants from countries that account for a large share of parolees. Again, we do not have a perfect representative sample of parolees. What can be said from Census Bureau data collected in 2024 is that, in general, new immigrants from the countries that make up much of the parolee population are significantly less educated than are the U.S.-born.

As the table shows, while it is not the case for all countries, relative to the U.S.-born a much larger share of new adult immigrants from parolee countries do not have even a high school diploma. For the most part, recent immigrants from parolee countries tend to be significantly less likely to have a bachelor’s degree than the U.S.-born. The lower level of education of immigrants from the primary parolee-sending countries has important fiscal implications.

<b>Table 1</b>				
<b>Educational Attainment for Recently Arrived Adult Immigrants from Countries that Sent a Significant Number of Parolees</b>				
<b>Country</b>	<b>&lt;HS</b>	<b>HS only</b>	<b>Some College</b>	<b>Bachelor's or more</b>
Cuba	9%	44%	12%	34%
Haiti	21%	34%	27%	19%
Nicaragua	29%	36%	11%	23%
Venezuela	7%	33%	16%	43%
CHNV countries*	13%	37%	17%	32%
Ukraine	3%	20%	17%	61%
Afghanistan	16%	56%	11%	18%
Guatemala	60%	27%	5%	8%
El Salvador	44%	31%	13%	12%
Honduras	39%	42%	8%	10%
<b>All the above countries</b>	<b>25%</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>14%</b>	<b>25%</b>
<b>U.S.-born</b>	<b>6%</b>	<b>29%</b>	<b>28%</b>	<b>36%</b>

Source: Oct, Nov, Dec public use 2024 Current Population Survey. Analysis confined to those who arrived 2020 to 2024 based on year of entry question in the survey. Values do not equal 100% due to rounding. \*Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela.

**Parolee Employment and Income.** The first column in Table 2 reports the share of recently arrived, working-age (18 to 64) immigrant men from the top parolee-sending countries who are employed. In general, immigrant men from these countries have relatively high rates of work. However, the second column in the table shows that employed immigrants from these countries earn significantly lower average wages than U.S.-born men. The third column in Table 2 reports income from all sources, not just wages, for recently arrived men from parolee countries. For the most part, new immigrant men from these countries have significantly lower average incomes than U.S.-born men. The same is true on the right side of the table when all adults are considered.

Country	Men Only			Both Sexes	
	Share 18 to 64 to 64 Employed	Average Wages for Employed Men	Total Average income from all	Average wages for Employed	Total Average income from all
	Cuba	74%	\$37,647	\$43,487	\$32,724
Haiti	34%	\$61,158	\$61,992	\$40,990	\$41,387
Nicaragua	91%	\$41,731	\$44,767	\$36,963	\$40,373
Venezuela	80%	\$24,843	\$27,915	\$22,578	\$26,193
CHNV countries*	72%	\$34,205	\$38,151	\$29,722	\$37,457
Ukraine	70%	\$57,494	\$58,045	\$56,988	\$57,453
Afghanistan	67%	\$11,933	\$13,777	\$15,225	\$17,949
Guatemala	84%	\$39,970	\$41,245	\$36,593	\$38,179
El Salvador	84%	\$23,821	\$25,428	\$25,958	\$27,170
Honduras	75%	\$20,808	\$24,829	\$22,879	\$26,013
All the above countries	75%	\$33,903	\$36,926	\$30,847	\$36,118
U.S.-born	77%	\$77,653	\$72,989	\$67,764	\$60,596

Source: Public-use 2024 Current Population Annual Social and Economic Supplement. Analysis confined to adult immigrants who arrived 2020 to 2024 based on year of entry question in the survey. \*Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela.

This is not surprising, given the large share with modest levels of education.

The significantly lower average wages and income of immigrants from these countries means they will almost certainly pay significantly less in taxes than the U.S.-born. Income is a key determinant of tax liability. Of course, we would expect the income of parolees to rise over time if they are allowed to stay in the country. However, when we look at all immigrants from these same countries, not just recent arrivals, we still find that their average wages and incomes are much lower than the U.S.-born.<sup>11</sup>

**Parolee Use of Welfare Programs.** Welfare use is an important indicator of fiscal impact because not only are the programs themselves costly, but those receiving them generally pay little to no federal or state income tax as well. Table 3 shows that, compared to the U.S.-born, households headed by recently arrived immigrants from the primary parolee-sending countries have much higher use of welfare, with the exception of new immigrants from Haiti. In addition to traditional welfare, Table 3 shows that households headed by recent immigrants from parolee-sending countries, for the most part, have incomes low enough to qualify for cash payments from the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) compared to the U.S.-born. The EITC is the nation’s largest means-tested cash anti-poverty program for workers. Table 4 only reports those with incomes low enough to receive cash payments. Not everyone eligible for the program

receives it. However, because parolees have work authorization and valid Social Security numbers it seems very likely that most parolees who are eligible for the EITC receive it.

<b>Table 3</b>					
<b>Use of Welfare and the EITC by Households Headed by Recently Arrived Immigrants from Countries that Sent a Significant Number of Parolees</b>					
<b>Country</b>	<b>Any Welfare</b>	<b>Cash</b>	<b>Food</b>	<b>Medicaid</b>	<b>Earned Income Tax Credit</b>
Cuba	51%	11%	40%	33%	33%
Haiti	10%	<1%	7%	10%	10%
Nicaragua	36%	5%	19%	31%	34%
Venezuela	46%	2%	35%	26%	36%
CHNV countries*	42%	5%	31%	27%	31%
Ukraine	65%	8%	24%	43%	28%
Afghanistan	88%	11%	56%	64%	51%
Guatemala	48%	10%	26%	41%	60%
El Salvador	74%	1%	55%	56%	75%
Honduras	61%	4%	51%	45%	51%
<b>All the above countries</b>	50%	6%	35%	35%	40%
<b>U.S.-born</b>	28%	5%	17%	19%	10%

Source: Public-use 2024 Current Population Annual Social and Economic Supplement. Analysis confined to households headed by immigrants who arrived 2020 to 2024 based on the year of entry question in the survey. Values do not equal 100% due to rounding. Cash programs include SSI, TANF and state assistance programs, food includes SNAP, school lunch and WIC. Any welfare includes cash, food, Medicaid and public and subsidized housing. \*Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela.

Putting aside Haiti, households headed by recent immigrants from parolee countries make extensive use of the welfare system and EITC. It may seem surprising that these households have such high welfare use, given that they are newly arrived in the country. But a number of factors explain this situation. First, some of these households have at least one U.S.-born child, who have full welfare eligibility. Second, those granted parole from Cuba, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Ukraine have the same

access to the welfare system as legal immigrants do in most cases. Third, as already mentioned, all parolees gain welfare eligibility after one year of residence in the U.S. Fourth, all individuals in the United States, including parolees, are eligible for certain programs such as WIC, free/subsidized school meals, and Medicaid for pregnant women. Fifth, some states offer welfare programs to aliens ineligible for federally funded welfare.

All of these factors, coupled with the large share of parolees with modest levels of education, and resulting low incomes, mean many qualify for welfare. In addition, there is a large welfare bureaucracy whose job it is to help those eligible for programs navigate the system. Finally, welfare costs are by no means the only costs parolees will create. Public education is one of the largest costs. We know that 20.8 percent of recent immigrants from the top parolee-sending countries are school-age (5 to 17).<sup>12</sup> Applying this percentage to the 2.8 million estimate of parolees in the country means that there are roughly 582,000 parolees in schools. In the United States, average expenditure per pupil is \$17,700 a year.<sup>13</sup> This translates into more than \$10 billion a year spent by public schools on parolees.

Country	Median Household Income	Avg. Household Size	Avg. Federal Income Tax Liability	Average Social Security Tax <sup>1</sup>	Average Medicare Taxes <sup>2</sup>	Liability for All Three Taxes	Average Tax Liability Relative to US-born
Cuba	\$36,000	2.6	\$13,540	\$3,410	\$1,001	\$17,952	94%
Haiti	\$55,238	2.4	\$4,665	\$2,512	\$698	\$7,875	41%
Nicaragua	\$78,408	3.2	\$11,437	\$5,068	\$1,381	\$17,886	93%
Venezuela	\$38,001	3.4	\$4,464	\$3,239	\$792	\$8,495	44%
CHNV countries*	\$40,001	2.9	\$8,591	\$3,388	\$917	\$12,896	67%
Ukraine	\$22,500	2.6	\$8,933	\$4,839	\$1,132	\$14,904	78%
Afghanistan	\$9,000	4.1	-\$3,146	\$1,137	\$266	-\$1,743	0%
Guatemala	\$40,001	3.9	-\$581	\$2,445	\$572	\$2,436	13%
El Salvador	\$34,000	3.5	-\$2,231	\$2,469	\$577	\$815	4%
Honduras	\$30,000	3.8	-\$1,436	\$2,551	\$597	\$1,712	9%
<b>All the above countries</b>	<b>\$36,540</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>\$5,161</b>	<b>\$3,120</b>	<b>\$803</b>	<b>\$9,085</b>	<b>47%</b>
<b>U.S.-born</b>	<b>\$81,421</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>\$13,502</b>	<b>\$4,469</b>	<b>\$1,189</b>	<b>\$19,159</b>	<b>n/a</b>

Source: Public-use Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement. Analysis limited to households head by immigrants who arrived 2020 to 2024. Those with negative federal income tax liability do not owe federal income taxes, and may receive cash payments under such programs as the EITC and ACTC. <sup>1</sup>Equals 6.2% of earnings up to the Social Security tax limit. <sup>2</sup>Equals 1.45% of earnings. \*Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela.

### Average Tax Payments.

Table 4 provides estimated federal tax payments for the primary parolee-sending countries. Overall, the table shows that on average households headed by immigrants from these countries generally have much lower median incomes and federal income tax liability. This is less true

for Social Security and Medicaid taxes. This is partly because immigrant households often have more workers than U.S.-born households, even if the average earnings of those workers are significantly lower. The federal tax liability of recently arrived immigrants from the primary parolee-sending countries overall are roughly one-third that of households headed by the U.S.-born on average. The leading parolee-sending countries make extensive use of welfare, but they also pay significantly less in federal taxes. This makes it almost certain that paroles are a net fiscal drain.

The federal income figures are those calculated in the 2024 survey by the Census Bureau and represent liability, not actual tax payments. Further, payroll taxes are calculated as a simple percentage of earnings. If immigrants from these countries are less likely to comply with tax laws, then their actual payments would be less. However, these individuals are eligible for work authorization, so the overwhelming majority should be paid on the books and thus subject to income and payroll taxes.

**Impact on Size of the U.S. Economy.** Using the 2.86 million parolees under President Biden as a starting point, it is possible to very roughly estimate the impact of parolees on the overall size of the U.S. economy. Based on Census Bureau data, 59.4 percent are working, earning a little less than \$31,000 (see Table 2). Their labor income adds something like \$52 billion per year to the U.S. GDP.<sup>14</sup>

But there are three things to keep in mind about this number. First the estimate does not consider the possibility that adding parolees to the labor market may reduce the wages and employment opportunities or have any other adverse impact on U.S.-born workers or legal immigrants. This estimate does not consider the possibility that adding these workers may

complement rather than compete with workers already in the country. Second, the size of the addition to the American economy is very small relative to U.S. GDP of roughly \$30 trillion. Third, although some may call the larger GDP that parolees create a “benefit” or “contribution” to America, it is not a measure of their tax contributions, nor does it represent the benefits they create for the U.S.-born. Almost all of the increase in economic activity immigrants in general or parolees in particular create goes to the parolees themselves in the form of wages — as it should, since they are the ones doing the work. There is no clear evidence showing immigration substantially increases the per capita GDP of the U.S.-born. Per capita GDP is what determines how well-off a society is.

## **Conclusion**

It is understandable many Americans focus on the plight of those who have left their homelands in search of a better life in the United States. But seeing the millions of individuals who arrived at our nation’s border in the last four years, or who wish to leave their home countries more generally, as simply desperate people facing desperate circumstances, fails to appreciate that they are also rational risk-takers who are responding to the incentives we create. By handing out parole in a fashion never before contemplated at the border or even flying inadmissible aliens into the country, the Biden administration encouraged ever-larger numbers of people to seek entry into the United States, creating the border crisis and pushing the overall level of immigration to levels never before seen.

Elected leaders are supposed to act in the best interest of the American people. By encouraging so many inadmissible aliens to come to the border by misusing parole, the Biden administration created a cascading series of consequences for the American people. My testimony today focused only on the scale of parole during the prior administration and the negative fiscal impact it almost certainly creates.

Prior research makes it clear that by adding large numbers of people to the country with modest levels of education, which parole has done, creates a net fiscal drain — taxes paid minus costs. That said, there is no evidence that parolees are lazy or that most come to get welfare. Rather, the limited data available on new immigrants from the top parolee-sending countries indicate they have lower levels of education than the U.S.-born. As a result, although many work, they tend to have modest incomes and make relatively modest tax contributions. At the same time, the data indicates that they make extensive use of the welfare system. All of this means they are a net fiscal drain on public coffers.

To avoid this situation in the future, parole needs to be used only as originally intended — as a limited program for a small number of otherwise inadmissible aliens on a case-by-case basis. Enforcing the law and sending as many parolees back to their home countries as possible will help avoid fiscal costs in the future. If the huge number of parolees currently living in the country are allowed to stay, so will the fiscal drain they create.

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<sup>1</sup> Section 212(d)(5)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

<https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?edition=prelim&num=0&req=granuleid%3AUSC-prelim-title8-section1182>

<sup>2</sup> Andrew R. Arthur, “Biden Has Paroled in Two Million-Plus Inadmissible Aliens”, Center for Immigration Studies, June 21, 2024. <https://cis.org/Arthur/Biden-Has-Paroled-Two-MillionPlus-Inadmissible-Aliens>

<sup>3</sup> George Fishman, “The Pernicious Perversion of Parole: A 70-year battle between Congress and the president”, Center for Immigration Studies, February 16, 2022. <https://cis.org/Report/Pernicious-Perversion-Parole#2>

<sup>4</sup> The Afghanistan Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022, and Additional Afghanistan Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (ASA) provided the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) with specific appropriations to provide parolees from Afghans with welfare benefits. See also “Benefits for Afghan Humanitarian Parolees”, Administration for Children and Families, Office of Refugee Resettlement, 2023.

<https://acf.gov/sites/default/files/documents/orr/Benefits-for-Afghan-Humanitarian-Parolees.pdf>. The Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (AUSAA) provided funding for welfare for parolees from Ukraine. See also, “Ukrainian Humanitarian Parolees Eligible for ORR Benefits and Services”, Administration for Children and Families, Office of Refugee Resettlement, March 2023. <https://acf.gov/sites/default/files/documents/orr/PL-22-13-Ukrainian-Humanitarian-Parolees-Eligible-for-ORR-Benefits-and-Services.pdf>. Cuban and Haitians granted parole under the Cuban Haitian Entrance Act are eligible immediately for most federal benefits. See “ACF’s Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) Benefits for Cuban/ Haitian Entrants”, Administration for Children and Families, Office of Refugee Resettlement, December 2022. <https://acf.gov/sites/default/files/documents/orr/Benefits-for-Cuban-Haitian-Entrants.pdf>. For more discussion, see Andrew Arthur, “The Welfare Giveaway in Biden’s Cuban and Haitian Parole and Release Programs”, Center for Immigration Studies, December 12, 2023. <https://cis.org/Arthur/Welfare-Giveaway-Bidens-Cuban-and-Haitian-Parole-and-Release-Programs>. See also George Fishman, “Parole with Benefits: A million Biden parolees march toward a multi-billion-dollar welfare ‘parole payday’”, Center for Immigration Studies, April 13, 2023. <https://cis.org/Report/Parole-Benefits>

<sup>5</sup> Andrew R. Arthur, “Did Joe Biden Really Parole In Nearly 3 Million Aliens? A review of the stats – and the Trump administration response”, Center for Immigration Studies, May 28, 2025. <https://cis.org/Arthur/Did-Joe-Biden-Really-Parole-Nearly-3-Million-Aliens>

<sup>6</sup> The “Immigration Enforcement and Legal Processes Monthly Tables”, OHSS website.

<https://ohss.dhs.gov/topics/immigration/immigration-enforcement/immigration-enforcement-and-legal-processes-monthly>. See page 4 (PDF page 8) in “Parole Requests Fiscal Year 2022, Report to Congress”, July 12, 2023, Department of Homeland Security. [www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-08/23\\_0712\\_cbp\\_fy22\\_parole\\_requests.pdf](http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-08/23_0712_cbp_fy22_parole_requests.pdf). See page 6 in “Parole Requests Fiscal Year 2023, Fourth Quarter, Fiscal Year 2023 Report to Congress”, April 3, 2024, Department of Homeland Security.

[www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-07/2024\\_0403\\_dmo\\_plcy\\_parole\\_requests\\_q4.pdf](http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-07/2024_0403_dmo_plcy_parole_requests_q4.pdf). As he explains in his blog, Arthur’s estimates also make adjustments to avoid double counting.

<sup>7</sup> DHS Operation Allies Welcome website (<https://www.dhs.gov/archive/operation-allies-welcome>) and Uniting for Ukraine website (<https://www.dhs.gov/archive/uniting-ukraine>).

<sup>8</sup> “The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration”, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.17226/23550>

<sup>9</sup> Daniel Di Martino, “The Lifetime Fiscal Impact of Immigrants,” Manhattan Institute, September 2024.

<https://media4.manhattan-institute.org/wp-content/uploads/the-lifetime-fiscal-impact-of-immigrants.pdf>

<sup>10</sup> The nine countries we report education and other data for in this testimony reflect the limited information available from the Parole Requests reports cited above and Border Patrol data showing the country of birth and the fiscal year of border encounters in recent years. Ukraine, Afghanistan, and Venezuela in particular are included in our list because the Biden administration specifically used parole to admit large numbers of individuals from these

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countries. However, the nine countries we do report data for do not represent the comprehensive list of all the countries parolees have come from.

<sup>11</sup> Table 2 shows that recent immigrant men from the top parolee-sending countries earn 40 percent as much as U.S.-born adult men. All immigrant men from these same countries, not just the recently arrived, earn 57 percent as much. This is a clear indication that more-established immigrants from these countries do earn more than their newly arrived counterparts, but their wages still lag significantly behind their U.S.-born male counterparts.

<sup>12</sup> This is based on analysis of the October, November, and December Current Population Survey for the top parolee-sending countries used throughout this report.

<sup>13</sup> Melanie Hanson, “U.S. Public Education Spending Statistics”, Education Data Initiative, February 8, 2025. <https://educationdata.org/public-education-spending-statistics>

<sup>14</sup> The figures for the share of recent immigrants employed from the major parolee countries come from an analysis of the fourth quarter monthly Current Population Survey from 2024.